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This thesis is concerned with the predictability of the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard. The aim is to understand the North 
American approach to international investment arbitration, especially how the FET standard has been interpreted and applied. 
Today, most Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) contain a clause on Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS). ISDS allows disputes between foreign investors and the host country to be settled through international 
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its growing popularity, ISDS clauses have not gone without their fair share of public critique. In Europe, the criticism against IIA 
culminated during the discussions on whether to include an ISDS clause in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP). There was a fear that American investors would be able to influence European regulators by threatening them with costly 
proceedings through the ISDS clause. This has been referred to as causing a “regulatory chill” on legislative initiatives.
Integral in the critique of ISDS is the assumption that proceedings in international investment arbitration are somehow biased towards 
investors. While this is by no means true statistically, the vagueness of investment protection standards, such as the FET standard, 
are often used as an example of the unpredictability of the whole system. Allegedly, host states are forced to settle the dispute as 
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standard on which investors base their claims. The standard has been criticized because of its vagueness, which allegedly gives the 
arbitrators too much discretion in deciding the investment disputes. The analysis of the predictability of the FET standard can thus 
be seen as a representation of the predictability of the system as a whole.
The focus of the analysis is limited to investment disputes decided under chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). It functions as a representation of the North American interpretation of the standard and provides for an excellent example 
of how investment arbitration can be used efficiently between developed economies. This thesis takes a qualitative approach to the 
question as the focus of the analysis is on a handful of prominent NAFTA chapter 11 awards.
The analysis is divided into the interpretation and application of the FET standard. The analysis of the interpretation focuses on the 
theoretical argumentation on which Tribunals have supported their awards. Here, the main conclusion is that the FET standard is 
considered part of the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens, also referred to as “CILMSTA.” There is 
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the actions of the state. The chapter on the application of the standard is a more concrete approach. When applied, the standard is 
not used as such, but is actualized through one of its subsequent elements. If one or many of the elements can be considered to 
satisfy the test of “outrage” or “shocking”, then there has been a violation of the FET standard. As it becomes evident throughout my 
survey of prominent awards, Tribunals are cautious of finding a violation of the standard. The threshold for breaching the standard 
is high, and it is only in exceptionally pronounced cases where the requirements of the test have been met.
In conclusion, it is evident that most Tribunals reflect the actions of the state to the reaction of an average impartial person. Tribunals 
are mostly conscious of the fact that a violation of the standard should be predictable and thus representative of a broader
understanding of fair and equitable treatment in customary international law. In the interest of correcting false perceptions that many 
concerned state actors may have, this thesis hopes to contribute with a nuanced perspective of the predictability of the FET standard
in North American investment arbitration.
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1“Laws and statutes become more or less powerless as long as they are not borne in the 
hearts of men by an honest will and of a mind that puts the love and righteousness above 
selfishness. It is in the hearts of the people that the foundation must be laid for peace and 
mutual trust both within society itself and among the people. Nothing can better serve unity
than when people are embodied by high goals that they through a self-sacrificing 
industriousness and a serious devotion to their thoughts and their lives are aiming at
realizing.”1
                                                
1 Speech by King Gustaf the Vth at the church meeting in Stockholm, 1925. The original speech was made in 
Swedish: Lagar och förordningar bliva mer eller mindre vanmäktiga så länge de icke i människornas hjärtan 
uppbäras av en ärlig vilja och av ett sinnelag, som sätter kärleken och rättfärdigheten över själviskheten. Det 
är i människornas hjärtan som grunden måste läggas för fred och ömsesidigt förtroende såväl inom 
samhället självt som folken emellan. Ingenting kan bättre tjäna enheten än att människor besjälas av höga 
mål och med självuppoffrande nit och allvar ägna sina tankar och sitt liv åt att förverkliga dem.
21 Introduction
Facing one of the world giants in international arbitration, the small Finnish legal team 
representing their clients in an investment dispute firmly insisted on an adherence to a 
principle of fair dealing. In his closing remarks, the lead council exclaimed that: “In 
Finland, we have this thing called ‘reilu meininki’“(transl. “fair dealing”).2 While the 
phrase was a direct citation from a Finnish sausage commercial, the concept of reilu
meininki could also be used as a reference to a broader principle concerning the fair and 
equitable interaction between the parties to an investment relationship. As with any general 
principles or standards, the main problem is whether they can be applied predictably. The 
most vocal opponents to international investment arbitration (IIA) argue that the vagueness 
of the standard makes its interpretation and application unpredictable, something that 
allegedly benefits foreign investors. As the title already suggests, the object of this thesis is 
to find out whether the fair and equitable (FET) standard represents a prevailing and 
predictable worldwide practice that a Finn would call reilu meininki.
My initial contact with the field was back in 2015 when the discussion about the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) was an issue of the public debate. 
At that time, one of the most controversial aspects of the TTIP negotiations, besides the 
infamous chlorine-chickens, was the Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) clause that 
was to be included in the agreement.3 Eventually, the negotiations between the EU and the 
US failed due to the public outcry. The failure of the TTIP negotiations is not definitive, 
and it is very likely that a new version of the agreement will be drafted shortly.4 Moreover, 
to alleviate future disagreements, a new agreement will have to include clauses on how 
disputes between investors and states will be settled. One possibility, which was already 
suggested by the Trade Commissioner during the TTIP negotiations, is that a permanent 
tribunal would be established to handle cases that are exclusively restricted to the 
agreement. 5 The question of how to improve the system to give it a better reputation is a 
widely discussed topic. While this will not be the topic of my thesis, it should be noted that
the FET standard is an inherent part of contemporary international investment law. 
                                                
2 Interview with Lindfors (2017).
3 See for example: Reuters, 14 July 2014. 
4 Deutsche Welle, 27 June 2017
5 European Commission, 16 September 2015. Such a system has already been established in connection with 
EU-Canada free trade agreement, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA).
3Whatever the future attempts of reform will bring to how we settle disputes between 
investors and states and however the new changes will affect formulations investment 
protection clauses in future trade agreements, the underlying idea with the standard of
protection will still most likely remain the same.
***
The FET standard constitutes one of the leading investment protection standards through
which ISDS claims are made. The primary opponents of an ISDS system argue that 
investors will be able to use the threat of a possible claim as leverage against domestic 
policy changes which in turn creates a regulatory chill on legislative initiatives. The 
opponents base this claim on the presumption that the investment standards applied in 
trade agreements are unpredictable, which makes it possible for investors to benefit from 
the uncertainty of the standard by using it as negotiation leverage.
It is especially important to understand North American way of interpreting the FET 
standard since this standard would most definitely be included in a possible future free 
trade agreement between the US and EU. We are seeing a development towards a 
balancing of the ISDS mechanism in the sense that it is being applied to investment 
relationships between parties that have traditionally been seen as capital-exporting states. 
The old view of International Investment Arbitration (IIA) functioning primarily as a tool 
for the North to protect its investments in the South is slowly disintegrating as the 
mechanism is increasingly used in North-North investment relationships too.6 In this 
situation, a comprehensive understanding of what the “northern” standard entails would 
substantially increase the predictability of a future FET clause in a free trade agreement. 
In the following two subchapters, I will further elaborate on the problem and impact that 
lies at the core of this thesis. The chapter concerning the problem considers the critique 
that has been directed against the ISDS system in general and the FET standard in 
particular. The problem is based on the idea of a “regulatory chill.” In turn, the regulatory 
chill has its roots in the unpredictability of the FET standard due to its alleged vagueness.
The subchapter that focuses on the impact is mostly connected with the problem. As the 
problem is primarily concerned with the vagueness of the FET standard, in status quo, this 
hurts public administration and judicial activity (if we take the threat of the regulatory chill
                                                
6 A recent example of this is the ratification of CETA, which contains both the FET standard and an ISDS 
clause
4to its fullest extent). However, the ideal aim of the thesis would be to change the impact by 
providing the relevant authorities, including policy actors, administrative workers and
judges, with a comprehensive familiarization of the “legal culture” in which the standard 
has been interpreted and applied in. Trough this, the thesis would illuminate the 
unpredictability connected with the FET standard, which the regulatory chill is mostly 
predicated on, and consequently create a much-needed understanding of the standard.
1.1 Problem
It is crucial to look at the critique that has been directed at investment arbitration and the 
presumptions about the unpredictability of the FET standard. The problem with the critique
is that it is inherently political. It is impossible to resolve the underlying political 
differences with a strictly jurisprudential approach.7 Here, I use the (political) critique as a 
way to navigate my way to the weaknesses in the system.8 Through this, I hope to be able 
to contribute with an answer that is facilitated by the same theoretical foundation as the 
critique.  This will become clearer in my theoretical part, where I expand further on the 
relationship between understanding the legal culture of the system and the predictability of 
the FET standard. 
The core criticism against ISDS clauses contained in Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) boils down to injustice. There is a stigma against 
arbitral proceedings. The fact that the parties appoint arbitrators does not induce the same 
institutional confidence that international and domestic courts enjoy. There is a perception 
that multinational corporations privatize justice, and that these corporations will be able to 
impose a regulatory chill on the state’s ability to legislate by fear of claims for damages 
that reach the millions.9
More specifically, vigorous criticism has been directed at the FET standard since it is 
worded in such a broad and vague manner, which allegedly grants arbitrators close to 
unlimited power to review sovereign acts of states, which inevitably affects its 
                                                
7 For more on this discussion, see Niemelä (2017). 
8 With ”system”, I am referring more generally to the area of international investment law, and more in
particular, to the dispute settlement mechanisms connected to it. 
9 For more on the critique against the ISDS system as a whole, see for example: Koskenniemi (2017), 
Sornarajah (2015), Van Harten (2007) and Cheng (2005). 
5populations.10 This is mainly the argument in favor of the regulatory chill.11 The regulatory 
chill that the ISDS clauses have on domestic legislation constitutes an imbalance in the 
relationship since the investor is always able to play his trump card, namely “see you in 
court.”12 There is a suspicion that international arbitration is somehow “dis-embedded” 
from the domestic political communities. 13
The regulatory chill argument is based on two assumptions. First, that the investor can
influence domestic legislation by threatening with “dragging the matter to court.” When 
states enter BITs, surely they do so with the knowledge that if they were to breach an 
article of the treaty, this breach might lead to a dispute settlement procedure. To suggest 
that this is in itself is causing a regulatory chill on future domestic legislation is a bit of a 
stretch. We need to keep in mind the fact that the primary reason for concluding BITs
(including other tools such as multilateral and free trade agreements) is the assumption of 
an increased flow of foreign direct investment (FDI).14 You cannot have your cake and eat 
it too. Therefore, what I interpret as the real regulatory chill is the possibility that the 
investor uses the threat of ISDS as an always-existing bargaining tool, by utilizing the 
vagueness of the standard. This seems more feasible. But is this the case?
To answer this question, I need to tackle the second assumption behind the regulatory chill
argument. The second assumption is that international investment tribunals are inherently 
biased towards investors in the application of the FET standard. 15 For the mere existence 
of ISDS clauses to have a regulatory chill on states domestic legislation, it is logical to 
think that the proceedings at an investment tribunal can be seen as a sort of risk-taking or 
even gambling. Once again, the contracting parties have agreed to the terms in the 
investment treaty, and should objectively look at the conditions that they have agreed to 
like something which is compatible with their domestic legal system as well as future
                                                
10 Van Harten (2007), page 88-90. Sornarajah (2015), page 248.
11 More on the regulatory chill, see Niemelä (2017), page 253-262.
12 Koskenniemi (2017), page 351. Koskenniemi talks about the inherent flaw in investment arbitration, and 
that its mere existence constitutes an imbalance in the relationship
13.“The main issue is really not about whether to decide in favor of investor interests or countervailing 
values. It is instead, whether to “protect the autonomous power of domestic political communities or to let 
the conditions of local lives be decided in the (‘dis-embedded’) processes of economic globalization.” Ibid., 
page 352.
14 There is a debate whether this is really the case, see for example: Egger & Pfaffermayr (2004) and 
Hallward-Driemeier (2003)
15 See further, Van Harten (2007), page 167-169.
6conventional legal reforms. Therefore, one could assume at the outset that the FET is 
interpreted and applied according to the ordinary meaning of the parties. However, for the 
chilling argument to remain standing, international investment tribunals have to apply the 
FET with an unfair bias towards protecting investor rights over state interests.16 A 
thorough empirical study of the underlying motivations of arbitrators is excluded from this 
thesis. However, I argue that the second assumption is denied if the predictability of the 
FET standard can be established. Here, I claim that arbitrator’s motivations should be 
inferred from the outcomes of the cases.17 One might argue that bias towards investor’s 
rights and predictability are not necessarily mutually exclusive.18 However, the motivations 
of arbitrators are of no interest if it is evident that the motives do not affect the outcomes. 
Since an observer can only conclude on the motives of arbitrators based on material things, 
the focus needs to be limited to such material things and actions that are relevant so not to 
risk resorting to arguments that are not based on anything else than a presumption of the 
arbitrator’s motives.19 Therefore, I focus on the predictability of the FET and draw 
following conclusions on the motivations of arbitrators solely based on the finding of the 
central question.
The best approach is, therefore, to analyze the FET standard at face value, approaching it 
with good faith and only drawing conclusions on predictability and motivations based on 
the observable outcomes of cases.20
                                                
16 This argument is not supported when looking at statistics from ISDS proceedings, which show that 37% of 
the disputes are won by States while the corresponding percentage for investors is 27%. However, it needs to 
be noted that 24% of the cases have been settled, which still affords the critics some leeway. See: Investment 
Policy HUB (2017).
17 This is based on a Jungian idea on how to discern a person’s motivations. The theory is that if the 
motivation is unclear, it should be inferred from the actions and the results that these actions lead to. For the 
purpose of argument, let’s say that the arbitrators concluded their awards in favor of the investor 90% of the 
time. Whatever the proclaimed motivations are, there exists a strong case in assuming that the arbitrators in 
general are biased towards investors.
18 This is the case, since arbitrators can consistently and in a predictable manner decide cases in favor of 
investors. Although it needs to be mentioned that experts in the field agree that most arbitrators take their role 
very seriously without giving any undue regard to the appointing party. Interview with Lindfors (2017) & 
Möller (2017).
19 This excludes arguments about the arbitrator’s motivation that include his or her sense of justice or 
fairness. However, it also excludes arguments about such motivations that pertain to social status or personal 
wealth, including arguments that connect the arbitrator’s motivation to that of reappointment. Van Harten 
(2007), page 167-169.
20 This is to say that we exclude presumptions on underlying motives. This is contrary to the assertions of 
many authors that argue that we need to critically analyze the system as a whole and not “accept” the system 
by analyzing its application of the law. See further: Sornarajah (2015), page 248 and Koskenniemi (2017), 
page 349.
71.2 Impact
An essential aspect that needs to be considered is the broader context in which the thesis is 
being produced. As I have already explained in the beginning, it is very likely that the EU 
and the US will try re-negotiating the failed TTIP agreement. The TTIP is by no means the 
only FTA that would include the FET standard in the investment relations between 
developed economies. It has already been included in the FTA between Canada and the 
EU, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which entered into 
force last year.21 It is especially important to understand the Northern American stance on 
the interpretation of the FET standard, as there is an apparent shift towards more regulation 
on the investment relationship between the two continents. We are seeing a development 
towards a balancing of the ISDS mechanism in the sense that it is being applied to
investment relationships between parties that have traditionally been seen as capital-
exporting states.22 In a new FTA, US investors would be able to bring claims against EU 
states, including FET claims, which are substantially different from the European standards 
of protection in the internal markets.23 In this situation, a comprehensive understanding of 
how fair and equitable is viewed in North America would substantially increase the 
predictability of a future FET standard in an FTA. The North-North investment partnership 
is by no means over; rather, it has only recently begun.
Among the fears about the investment arbitration system, the argument about the 
regulatory chill is of high potency. We can never know for sure, whether investment 
protection standards, such as the FET standard, are de facto being used as leverage against 
public authorities.24 In lack of such evidence, a study that focuses on discerning the legal 
culture in which the standard is being interpreted and applied does have at least the 
potential of mitigating the effects of the chill. Accordingly, this thesis could potentially 
correct false conceptions about the FET standard that negatively impacts policy and 
judicial decision-making, and possibly even work as a tool against investors who use the 
ISDS mechanism as leverage in negotiations. 
                                                
21 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), Brussels 14 January 2017, Official Journal of 
the European Union L 11/23. See annex for the whole FET clause contained in CETA.
22 The old view of IIA functioning as a tool for the North to protect its investments in the south is slowly 
disintegrating as the mechanism is being used in North-North investment relationships. 
23 For an extensive discussion on this, Niemelä (2017). See also: Eilmansberger (2009).
24 Niemelä (2017), page 254-255.
82 Methodology
My methodology is divided into two subchapters, one on theory and the other on method.
The subchapter on theory provides the thesis with a specific framework for looking at the 
whole academic and judicial discussion relating to the FET standard. The approach is a 
critical one. This means that the conceptual framework from which I analyze the material 
lacks any normative standard, it is instead an explanation of the legal culture as is.
The second subchapter focuses on the method used in the thesis. I have limited my
approach in two aspects. First, I have decided to solely focus on the application and 
interpretation of the FET. Second, I have limited my analysis to claims brought under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and thus I exclude all BITs and other 
FTAs. The main reason for this has already been discussed in the chapter on the impact, 
namely that it is only the Northern American perspective on the FET standard that is on
any relevance to this thesis. This is because future disputes that the critics fear would stem 
from CETA or a potential TTIP agreement.
2.1 Theory
My theoretical basis is a critical one and I therefore restrain from taking a normative 
approach on how the application of the FET ought to be. Instead, I focus on how the 
application of FET is made.25 I postulate that in understanding the “legal culture” where 
the standards is interpreted and applied should render the FET standard predictable to the 
observer. 
My understanding of predictability is deeply connected to my relation with law and society 
in general. When I was young, I had a fear of going to prison. I was afraid that I would do 
something that I didn’t know was illegal and as a consequence, I would be condemned to 
serve a lengthy sentence. I had heard of the big law books which were thousands of pages 
long. How could I know what was forbidden and what was allowed? At the time, I was 
calmed by hearing that children do not get sent to prison - there was still time to learn.
Now, this obviously seems like a silly fear to have. However, for a child that has little to 
no experience of the world, it is actually logical to take prison into account: if you do 
something wrong, you go to prison. Obviously, I no longer go around fearing a prison 
sentence. But what has changed in my perception? And why aren’t most people afraid of 
                                                
25 Cryer (2013), page 60.
9doing something illegal? How is it possible that most people are law-abiding citizens while 
few have actually read the law codifications that constitute the core of society’s code of 
conduct? There is a simple reason for this: people know how to act without explicitly 
knowing all the rules. The childhood fear is based on the belief that the law is a 
codification of rules and regulations that a group of people have just arbitrarily come up 
with. However, this is not correct. In its ideal form, laws are actually codifications of 
human behavior. It is simply an attempt at expressing something that we are already acting 
out. People don’t have to fear unknowingly doing something illegal because we observe 
that the law (ideally) corresponds with what we regard as acceptable behavior. In that 
sense, the law is predictable in a “good way.”26
In this thesis, I similarly try to analyze whether the FET standard is predictable in a good 
way. In practice, however, this project is in need of a more detailed theoretical framework. 
As the main critique against the ISDS system and the FET standard is being directed from
the point of view of critical theory, it is necessary to review the theoretical foundation in
which this critique has its roots.27
First, there is the theoretical framework for defining an abstract standard, such as FET. 
Here, I will try to rely on earlier works that have already laid out the theoretical 
framework. Koskenniemi has once used the analogy of holes in a net when describing 
expressions. A hole is empty in itself, and can only gain an identity through the strings that 
separate it from its adjacent holes.28 The same analogy could also be applied to the 
standard of fair and equitable treatment. This standard only exists through the lines that 
border it. If a tribunal finds that there hasn’t been a breach of the standard, then it gives us 
an indication of what exists “within the boundaries of the hole in the net.” While a 
dismissive award of a claimant’s allegation of a FET violation might not tell us where the 
                                                
26 By this I mean that a normal person can act in society without knowing a single law, and still be a law 
abiding citizen (more or less). Of course, the law can also be predictable in a “bad way”, as there can exist 
rules that do not correspond with ingrained human behavior, but that the members of society are still aware 
of. However, the main point here, is that there is a tendency in a democracy that laws are predictable in a 
good way as opposed to authoritarian countries, where the law is usually used as a means to justify arbitrary 
exercise of power.
27 This is an attempt to adhere to the principle of charity which aim is to consider the best and strongest 
possible interpretation of a subject’s argument in order to avoid attributing irrationality or falsehoods to the 
others sayings. See further Blackburn (2008), charity, principle of. 
28 Koskenniemi (1989), page 9. Koskenniemi further states, that ”[t]he sense of an expression is not 
determined ‘‘from the inside’’ but by the formal differences which separate it, make it different from other 
expressions in that langue. Meaning is relational. Knowing a language – understanding the meaning of 
words – is to be capable of operating these differentiations.”
10
bordering line exists, it can nonetheless serve as an indication of the ambit of the FET 
standard. It is then the final task of the thesis to conclude on whether the behavior that the 
standard either includes or excludes can be considered to represent codified rule of 
behavior that is already being acted out by default. Trough this, I will determine whether 
the FET standard thus can be viewed as being predictable in a good way.
Second, there is the more general theoretical framework through which the whole system 
of legal norms in international law can be observed. The reason why I have decided to use 
this theory is to ensure, that this thesis answers the critique against the FET standard with 
the “same tools.”29 Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the theory in further detail. In 
Critical Theory, or Critical Legal Studies, the ultimate goal is not to analyze how things are 
supposed to work; rather the object is to know how and why they work as they do.30 Law 
should, therefore, be studied as a world of facts consisting of individual legal decisions and 
therefore this study is decoupled from the world of ought.31 This idea is predicated on the 
famous slogan already formulated in American Legal Realism, “law is what judges do 
rather than what they say.”32
In critical theory, law, rights and legal theory are essentially “indeterminate.”33 This 
fundamental argument is representative of critical theory. The main assertion is that a legal 
decision cannot derive from legal norms or legal reasoning themselves, but are instead a 
product of the surrounding circumstances. As it has correctly been pointed out “Context is 
the Jupiter as well as Lucifer of interpretation.”34 This argument is usually supported by 
examples of the inconsistent application of norms.35 The indeterminacy of legal rules is
only a direct product of the structures of the collective constructs of thought, which at their 
                                                
29 If the critique would be answered by a strictly jurisprudential approach, the clash would not meet on the 
actual merits of the discussion, as the diverging views stem from different perspectives of looking at the law. 
In this context, I regard the theory as the “procedural law” on which I base my observations of the substantial 
material. 
30 Cryer (2013), page 60.
31 Frerichs (2012), page 43. Further on this subject, see: Siltala (2011), page 163.
32 Ibid., page 44.
33 Singer (1984), page 10.
34 Citing Robert Kolbs statement: ‘Context est le Jupiter de l’interpretation; mais il en est aussi le Lucifer’. 
Waibel (2011), page 577.
35 Koskenniemi (1989), page 60. Some argue that there are “extra systemic” factors that lie behind 
contradictory results, such as the incompetence of the judge or political preference. However, this contains 
the assumption that indeterminacy could be “cured” by the right behavior and same understanding of legal 
concepts. Koskenniemi argues that this is false, since indeterminacy follows as a “structural property of the 
international legal language itself.” Koskenniemi (1989), page 62.
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core are contradictory.36 Indeterminacy is a claim about the legal doctrine that argues that 
the doctrine allows for choice rather than limiting it.37
It is necessary to differentiate between the indeterminacy of standards and rules with
formal realizability.38 The latter is a dimension of rules which, in its extreme form, the 
judge can easily apply in a determinate way.39 The former, however, is not as easily
applied in the same way.40 A standard, according to critical theory, is a direct reference to a 
substantive objective of the legal order in question.41 In the context of indeterminacy, when 
the judge is applying a specific standard, the judge is forced to discover the facts of the 
situation and assess them against the ideals and social values that are inherent in the 
standard.42
Indeterminacy gives the power of interpretation to the individual and gives them the 
possibility to use their intuition in a specific situation. 43 Indeterminacy of law should not 
be seen as an external influence by politics that somehow distorts the otherwise predictable 
and determinate law; rather indeterminacy is an integral part of the law itself.44 The legal 
argument allows for the predictable defense of whatever position while at the same time it
is being constrained by a rigorously formal language.45 The fruit of indeterminacy is that 
the outcome of a legal dispute has little or nothing to do with either the norm or the 
                                                
36 Gordon (1984), page 114. Gordon further argues that: We are, the theory goes, constantly torn between our 
need for others and our fear of them, and law is one of the cultural devices we invent in order to establish 
terms upon which we can fuse with others without their crushing our identities, our freedom, even our lives. 
37 Singer (1984), page 11.
38 Kennedy (1976), page 1687.
39 Ibid., page 1688. An example of this is a situation where the judge is faced with applying traffic laws 
concerning speed limits. Within this context, the judge is able to act in an extremely determinate way. This 
should not be confused with a more general theory of the determinacy of law. A legal theory that is 
determinate gives specific guidelines on how to act. Essentially, it constrains our actions and sets out clear 
boundaries on what our choices are limited to. Singer (1984), page 12. According to Singer, “Determinacy is 
necessary to the ideology of the rule of law, for both theorists and judges. It is the only way judges can 
appear to apply the law rather than make it. Determinate rules and arguments are desirable because they 
restrain arbitrary judicial power.“. The total determinacy of law is an illusion. Interpretation without law 
creation is arguably not possible, since international law is ‘law in action’ which renders any attempt to 
declare a definite statement of the law pointless. Waibel (2011) page 576.
40 The same is true when the judge is faced with interpreting a policy or a principle. 
41 Kennedy (1976), page 1688. Kennedy lists some examples of this, including good faith, due care, fairness, 
unconscionability, unjust enrichment, and reasonableness.
42 Ibid., page 1688.
43 Singer (1984), page 13
44 Koskenniemi (1999), page 354
45 Ibid., page, 355.
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behavior; instead, it is mostly if not wholly dependent on the lawyer’s ability to use this 
formal language.46 Indeterminacy is, therefore, a product of the contradictory and 
transformational nature of the legal argument.47
How then is it possible for legal decisions to be predictable if we argue that legal doctrine 
is indeterminate? And does it mean that indeterminacy gives way to unlimited arbitrary 
judicial power? With regards to the first question, it is important to point out that 
indeterminacy and predictability are not mutually exclusive.48 Quite the contrary, there are 
stable regularities within the context of interpretation and application that makes it possible
for seasoned legal practitioners to make predictions for their clients.49 However, according 
to the Critical school, these regularities are not necessary consequences of the given rules. 
Instead, they can exist independent of them.50 Therefore, the argument is that there are 
predictable patterns of behavior and decision-making in the legal culture, which is not 
dependent on the actual argument made by the authorities applying the law.
The second question can arguably be clarified through making a distinction between 
arbitrariness and indeterminacy. It is necessary to remember, that indeterminacy does not 
mean that the choices made by judges are necessarily arbitrary or capricious.51 There is
therefore a crucial difference between arbitrariness and indeterminacy of legal arguments. 
Arbitrariness includes such a judgment where the deliberation is based on values that are 
not accepted by the majority and as such a test of arbitrariness is dependent on what kind 
of reception the judgment would get from a group of disinterested people.52 As mentioned 
above, when it comes to the indeterminacy of law, it is entirely possible for the outcome of 
                                                
46 Kennedy makes an interesting point on discourse in stating that ““Discourse is a system of interdependent 
arguments in which the value of each argument results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others” 
Kennedy (1980), page 375
47 Ibid., page 367. 
48 Gordon (1984), page 125.
49 Gordon argues that “[The Critics] don't mean-although sometimes they sound as if they do-that there are 
never any predictable causal relations between legal forms and anything else. As argued earlier in this 
essay, there are plenty of short- and mediumrun stable regularities in social life, including regularities in the 
interpretation and application, in given contexts, of legal rules. Lawyers, in fact, are constantly making 
predictions for their clients on the basis of these regularities” Gordon (1984), 125 
50 Ibid., 125
51 Singer (1984), page 20. 
52 An example of arbitrariness can be found in the Elsi case, where the Court stated that: ”Arbitrariness is not 
so much something opposed to a rule of law, as something opposed to the rule of law”. Elsi judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 1989, para. 128. See also: B. E. Chattin (United States.) v. United Mexican States (1929), page 295, 
para. 29, Asylum Case, (Colombia v. Peru), Judgement, I.C.J. Rep. (1950)., page 284.
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the decisions to be predictable as long as the context of the decision is familiar. The legal 
context includes the institutional setting, the customs of the community and the ideology of 
the decision maker.53 There are several reasons why an understanding of the legal context
could enable us to predict the legal results. Among these, one central idea is that judges 
and decision makers usually share a common legal culture, and while some legal doctrines 
and theories included in this culture could potentially be used as support for many different 
outcomes, there nonetheless exists a likelihood that some rules and outcomes are more 
attractive than others.54
In conclusion, the indeterminacy of legal doctrines is not equated to arbitrary legal
decisions. There can be predictability of legal decision even if we argue that legal doctrine
is indeterminate. The legal culture can explain the predictability of judicial decisions that 
they are given in. It is important to note the difference between rules that are formally 
realizable and indeterminate standards. The FET standard is undoubtedly part of the latter. 
Thus according to this theoretical framework, the arbitrator is interpreting and applying the 
standard by discovering the facts of a given situation and assessing them against the ideals 
and social values that are inherent in the standard. These ideals, or purposes, and social 
benefits are intrinsic in the legal culture in which the international investment arbitrator 
more or less adopts when entering the field. Therefore, I aim to give an account of the legal 
culture that forms the contexts for the awards where the standard of fair and equitable 
treatment has been applied. I hope to be able to provide an account of the regularities 
within the application of the standard mentioned above. If such regularities are found, it 
can be argued that the application is predictable.
2.2 Method
The method applied in this thesis is qualitative in that I have limited my observations to 
NAFTA chapter 11 tribunals that have interpreted and applied the FET standard.55 The 
method aims to analyze the most prestigious and cited awards in an attempt to get an 
understanding of the central tendencies of the legal culture. This research also includes 
interviews, where the aim is to get a “hands-on” account of investment arbitration 
proceedings where the standard has been applied. 
                                                
53 Singer (1984), page 21
54 Id..
55 Burton & Watkins (2013), page 55-65.
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I have decided to focus on the FET standard, since it has by far been the most popular 
standard used by investors when relying on ISDS clauses, both within NAFTA and 
internationally.56 I have limited the focus to NAFTA because of the predominant role that 
the US and Canada play in the development of international investment law. In light of the 
already binding CETA and a potential TTIP agreement, understanding how investment 
standards have been interpreted and applied in North America is of crucial importance.
My research question is evaluative in the sense that it assesses the interpretation and
application of the standard against the parameter of predictability. I briefly discussed the 
definition of predictability in the theory. The critical thing to remember is that 
predictability is connected to the legal culture in which the award is being given. As I
argued above, legal indeterminacy is not identical with arbitrariness. While they are not 
mutually exclusive, I still argue that if the observer knows the legal culture, the outcome of 
the dispute is more often than not predictable. 57 Ideally, a predictable FET standard is one 
that embodies rational behavior that is already being acted out.58
The method is divided into two chapters, the interpretation and application of the standard. 
In the chapter on interpretation, I have further divided the analysis into general 
interpretation and specific interpretation. The subchapter on general interpretation aims to 
reflect the interpretation of the FET standard with the general rules on interpretation
contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). The subchapter on 
specific interpretation gives an analysis on the internal conflicts of the standard and goes 
through the particular traits of its theoretical formulation. The second chapter, namely the 
application of the standard, focuses on how the standard has de facto been applied. As I
will later show, a violation of the FET standard always occurs through a breach of one of 
its concrete elements.
                                                
56 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), page 130.
57 That is, arbitrary awards are still possible within this framework since the legal culture can be predictable 
in a “bad way”. See footnote: 24. 
58 This is only limited to “good predictability”.
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3 Background
This chapter will give a short historical account of the different components out of which 
the FET standard has developed. The chapter is divided into three subchapters, which all 
aim to approach the standard from a different angle. The first and second subchapter 
focuses the political and legal aspect of protecting alien property. The third subchapter tells 
the story of how the actual means of safeguarding foreign property have developed. This 
development is crucial in the history of the FET standard since the standard is nothing 
more than the actual forum it is being applied in.59
In all, the chapter aims to further the understanding of the legal culture in which the 
standard is being interpreted and applied in. I argue that the standard is intimately 
connected to its history and that the agents (investors, governments and arbitrators) who 
have an interest hinged on this standard (claim damages, waive damages or deliberate well-
founded awards) all strive to reach the highest understanding of the FET standard. 
Consequently, predictability is primarily contingent on the culture in which the battle of 
the highest understanding is executed.
3.1 The Politics of the International Standards on Protecting Property
At the beginning of the 20th century, there was a broad consensus that an aliens property 
rights were inviolable and that positive international law protected the private property of 
aliens in times of peace.60 Before World War I, there can be said to have existed a National 
Treatment (NT) standard, since almost all states both recognized the right of private 
property as well as the obligation of the state to compensate an owner in situations where 
the state expropriated the property for public use.61 In his speech to the American Society 
of International Law, Elihu Root stated that: 
There is a standard of justice, very simple, very fundamental, and of such
general acceptance by all civilized countries as to form a part of the 
international law of the world. The condition upon which any country is 
entitled to measure the justice due from it to an alien by the justice which it
                                                
59 Today, the discussion about some abstract notion of ”fair and equitable treatment” would hardly be of any 
scholarly interest if it was not the case that the standard is actually being enforced by IIAs.
60 Bullington (1927),  694-696.
61 Lowenfield (2002), 392.
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accords to its own citizens is that its system of law and administration shall 
conform to this general standard. If any country’s system of law does not 
conform to that standard, although the people of the county may be content 
or compelled to live under it, no other country can be compelled to accept it 
as furnishing a satisfactory measure of treatment to its citizens. 62
This famous speech reiterated the principle of NT, meaning that states had to provide the 
same kind of treatment to aliens as they did to their citizens.63 Root nonetheless expressed 
his sentiment towards the existence of an international minimum standard of treatment, a 
general standard, as he calls it. 64 He referred to situations where NT did not suffice, and 
that other states should therefore not “be compelled to accept” such treatment that did not 
reach this unspecified general standard. What Root seemed to suggest, was that 
sovereignty could be limited in situations where states do not reach this general standard. 
The need for an international minimum standard became apparent through the socialist 
reforms around the world, mainly through the Mexican and Russian revolution.65 Here, the 
concept of private property was radically changed, which in turn created a need for explicit 
rules on the international standards of the treatment of foreign property.66
The different understanding of what constitutes as just compensation due to expropriation 
between Western and Latin American states can be exemplified through the diplomatic 
correspondence between the US and Mexico. The communication concerned the 
compensation of confiscations executed by the Mexican state. The United Secretary of 
state, Cordell Hull, fully recognized the right of the state to expropriate the property of 
American citizens but contended that the compensation of this property should be prompt, 
adequate and effective.67 This later came to be the so-called Hull Formula. The Mexican 
government denied that there existed such a rule in international law that would obligate 
                                                
62 Root (1910), page 16-27.
63 Lowenfeld (2002), page 392.
64 Root (1910), page 16-27.
65 For the purposes of this thesis, I will not focus on the Russian Revolution. There is no doubt that the 
Russian Revolution also played a large part in the international discussion of investment protection, as the 
property of many foreign aliens was nationalized in the process. See more on this: UNCTAD: Expropriation: 
Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II (New York and Geneva, 2012).
66 Obviously, the situation was more radical after the Russian revolution, where the whole concept of private 
property was abolished. 
67 Lowenfeld (2002), page 400
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the state to give adequate and immediate compensation to the alien.68 Here, the Mexican 
understanding of compensation was more aligned with the Calvo Doctrine. This doctrine
did not recognize any rights by foreigners that were not also accorded to nationals, which 
meant that aliens should not be able to seek redress through diplomatic protection.69 This
was thus an apparent reaction against ideas of an international minimum standard or the 
general standard that Root had talked about.
As it will become apparent in what follows, the FET standard began to be included in 
primarily in friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN) treaties that the US entered.70
From the beginning of the 60s, the standard started to be included in BITs that were being 
concluded between capital exporting and importing countries. While the relationship 
between the FET standard and the general standard, later known as the customary 
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens (CILMSTA), will be the focus 
of chapter three, there is no doubt that Roots vision slowly started to develop into a 
concrete standard. This will be discussed in the following subchapter.
3.2 The Law on the International Standards on Protecting Property
This subchapter focuses on how the FET standard has emerged in international law. It will 
give a short account of how the ICJ has dealt with the standard, after which it will focus 
on how the standard was gradually implemented in international treaties. 
3.2.1 The FET standard in ICJ adjudication
As a general disclaimer, it is necessary to point out that the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) has never dealt with the FET standard as it is understood in international investment 
law today. Despite this, there are some cases in which the Court has touched upon the issue 
of the treatment of investors and investments.
The Chorzów Factory case decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
in 1928, serves as an excellent example on how compensation was regarded in 
international law in the early part of the 20th century.71 The case concerned a dispute 
concerning the content of a bilateral treaty, the Upper Silesia convention (1922), and 
                                                
68 Ibid., page 401
69 For more information on the standard, see: OPIL: Calvo Doctrine/Calvo Clause (2007).
70 OECD (2011), page 5.
71 Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland) (Merits) PCIJ Rep Series A No 17 (1928)
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expropriations that had allegedly been made contrary to the treaty. The Court noted that 
compensation is only limited to the value of the expropriated property plus interest in 
situations where the government has the right to expropriate.72 Note that there is a 
difference between a (lawful) expropriation and an illegal seizure of property. In this case, 
the Court concluded that the seizure of the property had been illegal and drew the 
following conclusion on what the correct compensation should be: 
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act-a 
principle which seems to be established by international practice and in 
particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals-is that reparation must, as 
far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and 
reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that 
act had not been committed.73
It is relatively evident from the text of the judgment that this standard of compensation can 
only be applied to situations where the seizure has been illegal. Therefore, it could not be 
used as a fundamental principle of compensation for expropriation of foreign property, 
since expropriations are usually legal in that they have a legitimate aim that serves a public 
need.74 Nonetheless, the Court reiterated the vital principle regarding fair and just 
compensation that includes the obligation to compensate as a consequence of an illegal act 
to such a degree, that the financial situation of the claimant is in the same position that it
would have been, had the illegal act not been committed. Despite this, the ICJ has been 
silent on issues concerning the existence of a customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens.
Another ICJ case that is of interest within this context is the Elsi case, decided between the 
US and Italy in the late 1980s. In that case, the US argued that Italy had violated the FCN 
treaty between the two countries.75 The issue concerned the requisition done by an Italian 
Mayor of a plant owned by a US investor. The US argued that the Italian authorities had
allowed the plant to become occupied and that this constituted a violation against the 
prohibition of arbitrary and discriminatory acts prescribed by the FCN treaty. The ICJ 
                                                
72 Ibid. page 46-47
73 Id..
74 Sornarajah (2010), page 428.
75 Treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation between the United States of America and the Italian 
Republic. 2 February 1948. In force 26 July 1949. 79 UNTS 171
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found that the protection expressed in the FCN treaty did not guarantee the US investor 
that there would be no disturbance and that the requisition by the Italian government did 
not violate the requirement. The Court pointed out that the requirement should be 
measured according to the “minimum international standard.”76 In his dissenting opinion, 
Judge Schwebel argued that the underlying principle of the FCN treaty be that of 
“equitable treatment” and as such, the fact that the US investor had lost control despite 
being shareholders in the company, constituted a violation of the principle of “equitable 
treatment.”77
In the Oil Platforms case of 1996, the ICJ further touched upon the issue of “fair and 
equitable treatment,” contained in a treaty between the disputing parties.78 The dispute 
concerned the destruction of a US Navy ship and three Iranian oil platforms. The Court did 
not specify the meaning of the standard that was contained in Article IV (1) of the treaty;
however, in her separate opinion, Judge Higgins argued that: 
The key terms ‘fair and equitable treatment to nationals and companies’ and 
‘unreasonable and discriminatory measures’ are legal terms of art well 
known in the field of overseas investment protection, which is what is there 
addressed […]”79
As already mentioned, the ICJ has not taken a clear stance on the existence of the FET
standard and its definition. Apart from Judge Schwebel, who has been an active supporter 
of investment arbitration, the Court has been reluctant to take part in the discussion to a 
higher degree than the issues of each case has required of it. As it will be show in later 
chapters, the most prominent contribution to the development and definition of the FET 
standard can be found in the awards by investment tribunals. 
                                                
76 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) Case, (U.S.A. v. Italy), I.C.J. Rep. (1989). page 66
77 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) Case, (U.S.A. v. Italy), I.C.J. Rep. (1989). (Dissenting opinion Judge 
Schwebel). Page 88 and 97.
78 Oil Platforms Case, (Islamic Republic of Iran v U.S.A), I.C.J Rep. (2003)
79 Oil Platforms Case, (Islamic Republic of Iran v U.S.A), I.C.J Rep. (2003) (Separate opinion Judge 
Higgins). Page 59.
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3.2.2 The FET standard in treaties
The FET standard was first applied in its current wording by the US in its FCN treaties 
after the World War II.80 The standard functioned as additional security for non-
discriminatory treatment of both US nationals and its property.81 In 1959, the FET standard 
was included in the Draft Convention on Investments Abroad,82 which was later copied in 
the 1967 Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).83 In the OECD Draft Convention on 
the Protection of Foreign Property, Article 1 ensures that “every party shall at all times 
ensure fair and equitable treatment to the property of the nationals of the other 
Parties…”.84 In its commentary on Article 1, the FET standard is stated to require that the 
level of protection is the same as that which a Party affords its nationals. However, when
the national law or administrative practices fall short of the requirements of international 
law, the standard still requires conformity with the minimum standard that forms part of 
customary international law.85
It was not until the vast increase in BITs that the FET standard became the standard in 
treaties concerning international investment. The first BIT was concluded in 1959 between 
the Federal Republic of Germany and Pakistan. This constituted the beginning of a new era 
of international investment, and the subsequent decades witnessed an explosion of BITs
being concluded between states. Today, 180 countries have concluded more than 2900 
BITs and the average state has concluded about 32 BITs.86 Some authors argue that the 
reason why treaty drafters have consistently relied on the use of vague references to fair, 
equitable, reasonable or just treatment is that of their relative indeterminacy that has
allowed to parties to reach agreements which would, arguably, not have been the case if 
                                                
80 Vandevelde (2009), page 44
81 Weiler (2013), page  199
82 Draft Convention on Investments Abroad (Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention), issued April 1959. Not in 
Force. Article 1.:Each Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to the property of the 
nationals of the other Parties. Such property shall be accorded the most constant protection and security 
within the territories shall not in any way be impaired by unreasonable or discriminatory measures.
83 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property (OECD Draft Convention), issued 12 
October 1957. Not in Force. Article 1: Each Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to the 
property of the nationals of the other Parties.
84 Id..
85 Ibid., Article 1, page 9 para. 4(a)
86 ICSID Database (2017).
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they were expressed in more concrete terms.87 In the early days of its application, it can 
thus be argued that the FET standard was used as a tool for filling a “legal vacuum” which
other standards did not reach. 
What do investors seek protection from trough the FET standard? Aron Broches, one of the 
leading drafters of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention), has provided a useful
hierarchy of risks that a foreign investor faces in a host country.88 While this risk division 
mostly related to International Investment Guaranties, the same risks arguably apply when 
discussing international investment from a legal point of view. An investor could only be 
insured from measures that fall below the minimum standard. The absolute minimum 
standard has to protect from expropriation of nationalization without adequate 
compensation, which he refers to the political risk.89 The investor should also be protected
from the inability to repatriate capital, which he calls a transfer risk, and the loss that is 
connected to international war referred to as a calamity risk.90 These standards are 
definitive in a sense that there exists no disagreement on these on their existence.91 Then, 
there exist those risks for investors that do not constitute an outright expropriation but 
where the investor is nonetheless deprived of the control or the benefit of his investment, 
often referred to as creeping expropriation. The last category of risks, or rather a standard 
of treatment, refers to minimum rules of proper conduct against foreign investment, which 
includes protection against discrimination.92 It is important to note that by no means was 
Broches arguing in favor for a global system in which a foreign investor is free from all 
risks and that the investor always carried its own business-related risks.93
                                                
87 Weiler (2013), page 188. More on this discussion, see: Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), page 133 and Brower II 
(2002), page 78.
88 Möller Interview (2017)
89 Ibid., page 82.
90 Id..
91 However, there throughout the development of international investment law, countries have disagreed on 
the exact obligations of the state with regards to these protective standards. For example, see the 
correspondence between Mexican and US Secretaries of States, where they dispute how a foreigner ought to 
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Historian, 15 December 2017.
92 Broches (1962), page 82.
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While most of the abovementioned risks could arguably be included in the FET standard, 
the last category of “creeping expropriation” is indeed most fitting for the standard. As it 
will become clear in chapter 5, there are many different elements of which the FET 
standard is composed. In most situations, the question in the dispute concerns the deprival
of control or benefit of the investment. In any event, it is clear that the further away we get 
from the political risks that include outright expropriation or nationalization, the blurrier 
the line between the alleged breach of a minimum standard and a risk that is connected to 
normal business. 
3.3 Means of Protecting Alien Property
The means of settling international disputes have varied through the course of history. As 
western states started to turn their back on using gunboat diplomacy as a means of 
enforcing their demands, the need for binding and comprehensive legal instruments of 
enforcement became necessary. The following subchapters will give a short account of the 
development of the international recognition and enforcement of international arbitral 
awards. These developments constitute the foundation of how we view international 
dispute resolution today.
3.3.1 Diplomatic Protection
At the beginning of the 20th century, investment disputes and subsequent investment 
protection were usually managed through diplomatic negotiations executed between states. 
It is important to note, as the ICJ already pointed out in the Palestine Concessions case in 
1924, that a state was, in reality, asserting its rights, namely its right to ensure the respect 
of the rules of international law of its subjects.94
Settling investment disputes through diplomatic protection was a burdensome task since it 
necessarily meant that the investor was forced to convince their home states to advocate on 
their behalf. Procedures for diplomatic protection were in direct connection to geopolitical 
and diplomatic ties between the disputing states. These ties were obviously highly 
influential on the negotiations and investors could never entirely rely on a neutral 
                                                                                                                                                   
should be treated. For further information on the project, see: Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
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procedure.95 This can further be exemplified by the pronouncements made by the ICJ in 
the Barcelona Traction case in 1970, where the court stated that:
“The State must be viewed as the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be 
granted, to what extent it is granted, and when it will cease. It retains in this 
respect a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by 
considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case”.96
As the Court points out, it is completely up to the state whether it finds that the dispute in 
question is “worth it,” considering political and other factors that are unrelated to the actual 
dispute. This was obviously not an adequate remedy for an investor, as there was no way 
that the investor could rely on the fact that its interest was prioritized by its home state 
rather than geopolitical relations between the states.
3.3.2 International Arbitration
International arbitration constitutes a cornerstone in the development of investor-state
disputes. As mentioned above, diplomatic protection was a burdensome channel through 
which the investor had to seek remedies, and this was only if the home state found it to be 
beneficial to its geopolitical aspirations. The crucial change in the development was the 
exclusion of the home state from the dispute process, which was replaced by third-party
investment arbitration. This would not have been possible had it not been for the general 
development of international commercial arbitration. This subchapter will therefore focus 
on the general recognition of international arbitration.
As international commerce expanded over the 20th century, states increasingly made 
attempts to facilitate commerce between corporations from different countries by giving 
individuals a more significant role in the resolution of commercial disputes.97 The Geneva 
Protocol on Arbitration Clauses (Geneva Protocol of 1923) constitutes one of the 
cornerstones in the development of international arbitration.98 The protocol was drawn up 
                                                
95 Weaver (2014), 229. Here, neutrality is refer to the absence of geopolitical influences.
96 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment, (Belgium v. Spain) Judgement, I.C.J. 
Rep. (1970), para. 79
97 Van Harten (2007), page 50
98 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Geneva 24 September 1923, 27 LNTS 157.
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by the League of Nations by the initiative of the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) and was mostly signed by European states.99 The protocol obligated the parties to:
“[S]ubmit to arbitration all or any differences that may arise in connection 
with such contract relation to commercial matters or to any other matter 
capable of settlement by arbitration, whether or not the arbitration is to take 
place in a country to whose jurisdiction none of the parties is subject to”100
According to the protocol, each Contracting state had still reserved the right to limit the 
definition of which contracts that are considered commercial according to their domestic 
laws. In addition to this, all arbitral procedures were to be governed by the law of the 
country in whose territory the arbitration took place.101 This protocol was complemented
by the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 (Geneva 
Convention of 1927).102 The Geneva Convention of 1927 obligated the recognition of 
arbitral awards covered by the Geneva Protocol of 1923.103 This opened the possibility for 
parties to enforce the arbitral award in the territory of any state party to the treaty. 
However, the Geneva Convention of 1927 demanded that some conditions have been met
before an award could be recognized and enforced. One of these conditions was that the 
subject matter of the award had to be consistent with the law of the country in which the 
award was sought to be relied upon.104 The sentiment behind these conditions 
demonstrated a will to preserve domestic judicial autonomy.
In 1953, the first initiatives to replace the Geneva Treaties were taken by the ICC. The idea 
behind this initiative was to create a new international system of enforcing arbitral awards 
in which the awards were ‘truly international,’ i.e., enforceable regardless of domestic 
laws.105 This was based on the critique of the Geneva treaties, which central defects had 
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101 Ibid., Article 2 & 4. 
102Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Geneva, 26 September 1927. In force, 25 July 
1929, 2096 LNTS 301.
103 Id..
104 Ibid., Article 1 (b). For all the conditions, see Article 1 & 2
105ICC, Report and Preliminary Draft Convention adopted by the Committee on International Commercial 
Arbitration (13 March 1953), 9/No.1 – May 1998. Page 2. In actual fact, the idea of an international award, 
i.e. an award completely independent of national laws, corresponds precisely to an economic requirement. It 
is certain that a commercial agreement between the parties, even for international transactions, will always 
be linked tip with a given national system of law. Nevertheless, the fact that an award settling a dispute 
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been that enforcement was only possible if the awards were strictly in accordance with
domestic rules and procedures. The United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) took over this initiative and published its amended draft convention in 1955.106
This draft led to the establishment of the New York Convention in 1958.107 During the 
negotiations of the New York Convention, the point of clash took place between the 
expansion of the recognition of commercial arbitration and the need to preserve domestic 
judicial autonomy.108 While initiatives within the UN were more modest than that of the 
ICC, the New York Convention did nonetheless bring significant changes to the 
enforcement of international arbitral awards. The Convention required states to recognize 
arbitral awards in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award 
is relied upon, thus excluding the requirements from the Geneva Conventions that the 
award had to be consistent with the domestic law of the recognizing state.109 This meant 
that a significant degree of judicial control that had been exercised over arbitral awards 
was relinquished. Therefore, it is not without reason that the New York Convention has 
been regarded as one of the most important cornerstones in the international arbitration.110
3.3.3 The Inclusion of Public Law in International Arbitration
As witnessed above, there was a gradual change in attitude towards international 
arbitration and its relationship with the domestic law. The New York Convention 
constituted a real paradigm shift in the enforceability of international arbitral awards. The 
success of the Convention still manifests itself today, as the primary way of solving 
international commercial disputes is done through international arbitration.111 This 
subchapter will focus on the emergence IIA. 
                                                                                                                                                   
arising in connection with this agreement will produce its effects in different countries, makes it essential that 
it should be enforced [8] in all these countries in the same way. The development of international trade 
depends on this.
106ECOSOC, Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, (28 March 
1955) UN Doc E/2704, E/AC.42/4/Rev.1.
107 United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration (New York, 20 May-10 June 1958) 
UN Doc. E/CONF.26/8/Rev.1. 
108 Van Harten (2007), page 51.
109 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), 
New York 1958, in force 7 June 1959, 4739 UNTS 330. Article III
110 Van Harten (2007), page 53. 
111 The main reason for this is the predictable framework of enforceability that the New York Convention 
provides. It is far more un common that commercial actors rely on the domestic judicial system in situations 
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As the New York Convention still allowed states to limit their obligations to commercial 
disputes, foreign investors were still left without an effective remedy against the host state 
when it was acting in the capacity of a public authority.112 However, this situation changed 
as a new legal tool became available to foreign investors. The ICSID Convention was
concluded in 1965 and opened the possibility for regulatory disputes between states and 
investors to be settled in international arbitration.113 Through the Convention, the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was established as a 
part of the World Bank Group.114 It is noteworthy, however, that there was no immediate 
rush by investors to utilize the new form of international arbitration. It was the inclusion of 
the ISDS clauses in BIT that gradually increased the amount of investor-state disputes. 
According to a report made by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) in 2016, it was not until the beginning of 2000 before there was a significant 
increase in ISDS cases.115
The awards that have been given under the ICSID Convention are final and binding, which 
means that the domestic courts of the member states to this Convention cannot overturn 
them with certain exceptions.116 In addition to this, member states to the Convention, 
regardless if they are parties to the dispute, are obligated to recognize and enforce the 
                                                                                                                                                   
where they wish to enforce the judgment in another country. This is mainly due to the problems with 
enforcement but also Other reasons for the popularity of international arbitration over domestic courts is the 
possibility of confidentiality as well as the freedom to appoint the arbitrators in the proceedings
112 New York Convention (1958), Article I.3. That is to say, that international arbitration was limited to 
commercial disputes, which in turn can be considered to be part of the private sphere. This did not exclude 
the possibility that the commercial actor disputed with a state. However, in these cases, the state was 
essentially functioning as private actor in these disputes. The jurisdiction given to arbitrators in commercial 
disputes is still limited to the contract between the parties and the object of the dispute does not concern the 
states exercise of public authority over individuals. See further: Van Harten (2007), page 5.
113 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States 
(ICSID Convention), Washington D.C. signed 13 September 1966. In force 14 October 1966. 8359 UNTS 
575.
114 ICSID provides an institutional framework for the investment disputes. This includes facilities, a 
secretariat etc.  
115 During the whole 90s, there were fewer than 30 cases in total, while during the 00s there were around 300 
cases. See further: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2016), page 104. 
116 ICSID Convention, Article 53. In some instances, set aside proceedings are possible, see for example 
United Mexican States v Metalclad Corp, 2001 BCSC 655. Another important thing to note is the role of the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), UNGA Res 31/98.). These rules are 
used in some ISDS proceedings, and provide a procedural framework for the Tribunal. The ICSID 
Convention also contains rules for procedure for the arbitral tribunal. Roughly speaking, it is at the discretion 
of the parties to choose which rules they wish the Tribunal is governed by. However, the important thing to 
note is that the whole system behind IIA is predicated on the ICSID Convention, and as such the UNCITRAL 
Rules are of little importance in this thesis.
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awards as if they were a final judgment of a court in that state.117 The jurisdiction of an 
investment tribunal is extended to any legal dispute that arises directly out of an investment
between a contracting state and a national of another contracting state, as long as there is a 
reference to arbitration in the BIT or FTA as the primary way of resolving disputes.118
The parties must consent to arbitration in writing when submitting a dispute to ICSID.119 It 
is important to note, that the mere participation in the Convention does not in itself infer 
any obligations on states to consent to ICSID jurisdiction.120 There are three different ways 
of giving consent to arbitration: direct agreement, national legislation and treaties. From a 
public law perspective, we are interested in the latter alternative, namely consent trough 
treaties. The most common treaties in which consent to arbitration at the ICSID occur are 
in BIT. Other treaty forms, such as FTAs and regional multilateral treaties (NAFTA and 
the Energy Charter Treaty) also include the state parties consent to arbitration, that is, the 
treaties have included ISDS provisions in the treaty text.121
According to the ICSID Convention, written consent is required of both parties. With 
regards to the investor relying on a BIT between his home state and the host state, the 
investor will have to consent to arbitration separately. In practice, however, the fact that an 
investor institutes proceedings at the ICSID are usually sufficient to be considered as 
consent.122 If states consent to arbitration in a BIT, they are automatically bound by the 
jurisdiction of the investment Tribunal in all legal disputes concerning the treaty that 
originates from a claim by an investor from the other state. Today, consent trough BITs 
                                                
117 Ibid., Article 54.
118 Here I use the term “investment Tribunal” although it is synonymous to IIA, ICSID-tribunal and 
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119 ICSID Convention, Article 25 (1)
120 UNCTAD, Capital Accumulation, Growth and Structural Change (Geneva 2003) 
UNCTAD/TDR/2003.Page 5. 
121 Ibid., page 6
122 AMT v. Zaire, Award, 21 February 1997, 36 ILM 1531, 1545/6 (1997). In the present case, it happens 
that AMT (...) has opted for a proceeding before ICSID. AMT has expressed its choice without any 
equivocation; this willingness together with that of Zaire expressed in the Treaty, creates that consent 
necessary to validate the assumption of jurisdiction by the Centre.
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have become accepted practice and can be found in the overwhelming majority of new 
BITs.123
In cases where consent have been given in treaties, the jurisdiction of the ICSID is 
primarily based on a general consent by the states which is groundbreaking if we compare 
it to the New York Convention, where international arbitration is limited to the conditions 
in a contract between the parties. This constitutes a radical change in the development of 
international arbitration since it permits investment arbitration to be used as a form of 
public law adjudication.124 As mentioned above, the jurisdiction of an investment tribunal 
is extended to any legal dispute that arises directly out of an investment.125
In conclusion, this system provided three new possibilities to foreign investors seeking a 
remedy from the host state. Namely, it made it possible for the foreign investor to a) sue a 
host state through private international arbitration that was b) acting in the capacity of a 
public authority c) concerning a violation of public international law.
4 General Interpretation of the FET Standard
In the following two chapters, the aim is to analyze the interpretation of the FET standard. 
This analysis is an attempt to reaching an abstract definition of the standard. The standard 
is part of binding law, both in specific treaties as well as in customary international law. If 
we go back to the analogy to the fishing net, one could make the argument that this aim is 
useless, since it is impossible to conclude the definition of the standard in the abstract. 
While this critique is justified, it is necessary to note that the starting point for interpreting 
the standard is that it is being interpreted and applied as a law, and not according to ex 
aequo et bono.126 Therefore, we need to accept the premise that there exists an ideal form
or archetype of the FET standard that is grounded in the treaties and customary 
international law. From a theoretical standpoint, the aim is not so much to try to find an 
actual definition, or the ideal form itself; instead, the aim is to become familiar with the
legal culture surrounding the definition of the standard. Therefore, this thesis does not 
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provisions. See: OECD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement (Paris 16 May - 9 July 2012), page 8.
124 Van Harten (2007), page 55-56
125 ICSID Convention, Article 25 (1)
126 Further on this, see: OPIL: Ex Aequo et Bono (2009)
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concern itself with taking a normative approach to how the standard should be interpreted
since this would be a counterintuitive approach in light of the research question that is 
concerned with the predictability of the standard.127 Therefore, it is only concerned with 
how the standard is de facto being interpreted.
The following two chapters have divided the analysis of the interpretation into two parts, 
one general and one specific. The general part discusses the rules of interpretation and how 
different Tribunals have used the tools specified in these rules. The specific part analyzes
the particular approaches that both states and Tribunals have adopted in trying to define 
and interpret the FET standard. It also discusses the notes of interpretation concerning the 
standard that was published after some controversial awards.128 The notes of interpretation
constitute a crucial milepost in the development of the standard, and as it will be shown in
the next chapter, it had severe implications on the following awards.
A final note should be made on the abbreviation used. When referring to the minimum 
standard of treatment, writers and Tribunals alike are talking about the CILMSTA.129 The 
relationship between the FET standard and CILMSTA is discussed in chapter 5.
4.1 Sources of International Investment Law
The sources of international investment law, that is, the accepted sources that an 
investment Tribunal can base its award on, follow the same rules as accepted in 
international law. A complete list of the sources applied in international law can be found 
in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute.130 Primary sources of international law include treaties, 
custom and general principles of law.131 Subsidiary means for determining the primary 
sources include judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.132
                                                
127 That is, even if this thesis could reach a definition on the ideal form of the FET standard, this would give 
the research question little to no guidance on the predictability. This assertion is strongly rooted in the 
principle that the law is what judges do rather than what they say they do. It would be possible,at least in 
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128 The controversy was related to how the FET standard should be interpreted, with regards to the 
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international investment law: equality, discrimination, and minimum standards of treatment in historical 
context (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013) 
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131 Ibid., Article 38(1) (a-c). 
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In the Continental Shelf case, decided in 1969, the ICJ laid out precise requirements on the 
establishment of a rule in customary international law.133 If a party to a dispute claims that 
there has been a violation of such a rule, the Claiming party has to show sufficient state
practice and opinio juris.134 For the requirement of opinio juris to be satisfied, the Court 
argued that “States concerned must […] feel that they are conforming to what amounts to a 
legal obligation.” and added that ”The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is 
not in itself enough.”135
The ICSID Convention includes the same rules of sources of international law as 
prescribed in the ICJ statute. Tribunals can either give an award based on an agreement 
between the parties or based on “such rules of international law that may be applicable,”
which usually includes investment treaties and customary international law.136 A tribunal 
cannot bring a finding non liquet, that is, a Tribunal is forced to give an award regardless 
of the law is silent or obscure.137 Only if the parties agree, can the Tribunal decide a 
dispute ex aequo et bono.138 In none of the reviewed cases in this thesis have the parties 
accepted to this.
In addition to this, Tribunals rely extensively on subsidiary means for determining the 
specific rules prescribed by investment treaties and customary international law. As this 
chapter will later show, Tribunals make extensive reference to other awards. 
4.2 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, Article 31
In addition to the rules on what sources may be used in an award, the Tribunal will also 
have to follow the rules on how to interpret these rules. This chapter does not aim to prove 
that the existence and application of rules of interpretation would automatically render the 
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application of the FET standard more predictable. Lauterpacht (1949) already argued that it 
is a fallacy to believe that the existence of rules of interpretation would safeguard against 
arbitrariness or partiality since the very choice of a specific rule of interpretation is 
grounded in the judge himself.139 However, the fact that many Tribunals do use the VCLT 
as support for their interpretation is still a step in the right direction.
The primary approach by a Tribunal in interpreting a provision in an investment treaty is
by invoking Article 31 of the VCLT, which provides for the approach that: 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose.140
The article constitutes the foundational rule for all interpretation in international law, 
including international investment law.141 How then, has the interpretation of the FET 
standard been influenced by Article 31 of the VCLT? The following subchapters try to 
clarify this question.
4.2.1 Ordinary Meaning
Interpreting the FET standard according to its ordinary meaning provides little guidance in 
determining how to interpret the standard.142 Article 1105 of NAFTA reads as follows:
“Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party 
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security.” [Emphasis added]143
There are four important elements of the minimum standard contained in Article 1105 that 
can be extracted using the ordinary meaning approach. First of all, it is necessary to note 
                                                
139 Lauterpacht, (1949), page 53. To be fair, this statement was made before the VCLT had been conceived. 
140 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), Vienna 23 May 1969, In force 27 January 1980, 1155 
UNTS 331. Article 31(1)
141 In general, there is an “unspoken assumption is that the VCLT represents customary international law.” 
OPIL: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2006). However, Article 4 of the VCLT provides that the 
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into force, which is 27 January 1980. This means that BIT that have been concluded before its entry into 
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142 Dumberry (2013), page 58. 
143 NAFTA, Chapter 11 Article 1105(1)
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that this article provides for an absolute minimum standard of treatment. As contrary 
examples, both the NT and Most-favored-nation (MFT) standards provided by Articles 
1102 and 1102 are relative standards; they depend on what kind of treatment is given to 
nationals or other investors. Second, there is also a similar difference in relation to other 
articles in chapter 11, since this article only protects investments, not investors. Third, the 
article refers to international law. Some writers have referred this to this reference as “a 
window through to another set of rules.”144 The reference to international law may be seen
as the “controlling element” in applying the article.145 As such, the FET standard is bound
by the sources of international law and cannot be determined by the individual arbitrators 
understanding of equity or other subjectively contributing factors.146 Finally, the meaning 
of “fair and equitable” in itself deserves some attention. “Fair and equitable” should be 
regarded as a separate legal concept, and as such should not be confused with “equity” or 
“ex aequo et bono,” as already pointed out.147 The FET standard is rather something that 
transcends the individual words of which the standard is composed.148 As such, the FET 
standard may be regarded as the rule of law with specific content.149 However, as a famous 
commentator pointed out in a statement about the meaning of the standard:
" [F]air and equitable treatment" in Article 1105(1) represents the exemplification 
of an intentionally vague term, designed to give adjudicators a quasi-legislative 
authority to articulate a variety of rules necessary to achieve the treaty's object and 
purpose in particular disputes.150
While it is debatable whether the vagueness is a conscious design in the standard, it is true 
that the broad wording of the standard gives the interpreting Tribunal a broad leeway to 
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146 Grand River v. United States, Award, (12 January 2011), para. 174
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Both in Mondev and ADF, the Tribunals have pointed out that the standard is anchored in in international
law. “[A Tribunal] may not simply adopt its own idiosyncratic standard of what is “fair” or “equitable”,
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apply it in practice.151 Some commentators have pointed out the usefulness of its 
vagueness, while others have directed sharp critique against the lack of any clear 
conceptual vision of the principle’s function.152 One argument in favor of its vagueness is 
that it provides a useful tool against the complex nature of investment disputes. A common 
criticism is that the vagueness gives the arbitrations unlimited discretion to decide on
investment disputes. This criticism is founded if the focus is limited to the literal meaning 
of the standard. However, it excludes the possibility that there is an outer rim, or a 
bordering net, that prohibits the arbitrators from interpreting the standard solely by 
following their idiosyncrasies. It may well be, that while the ordinary meaning of the FET 
standard gives the arbitrator much leeway, this interpretative freedom is nonetheless 
contained and limited by the legal culture in which it is being applied.
In conclusion, the “fair and equitable” is a complex legal rule of law that consists of 
specific elements that prohibit a certain behavior of states. Little guidance is to be had from 
a dictionary meaning of “fair” and “equitable,” as the purpose of the words is to fill a legal 
function that goes beyond their literal meaning. This will be clarified in chapter 5, where
the specific elements that make up the standard will be analyzed. 
4.2.2 Object and Purpose
Of the various sources that a Tribunal can draw its interpretation from, the object and 
purpose serve as the primary guide for this task.153 In investment treaties, the object and 
purpose can in most cases be found in the preamble of the BIT or FTA. The preamble text
is usually supportive of things such as “economic cooperation” and “stimulating 
investment initiatives” between the two parties. 154
                                                
151 On the historical reasons for the vagueness, see: Weiler (2013), page 188.
152Schreuer (2005), page 365; Vasciannie (2000), 104. On the latter view, see:Schill (2008), page 37. Schill 
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Article 102(1) of the agreement prescribes the objectives of NAFTA. Among other, fair 
competition and eliminating barriers to trade are listed as one of the objectives.155 The 
article further obligates the parties to “interpret and apply the provisions of this Agreement 
in the light of its objectives set out in paragraph 1 and in accordance with applicable rules 
of international law”. 156 As the objectives are expressed in a very general way, it is 
doubtful whether they provide any additional guidance in interpreting the FET standard.157
From this, it is possible that by including the object and purpose of the interpretation of the 
FET standard, the arbitrator is still left standing at the same position as before. In the end, 
it is up to the arbitrator's own discretion whether to emphasize the protection of the 
investor’s interests or the regulatory flexibility of the state.158
In ADF v United States, the dispute concerned a domestic law which, according to the 
investor, put excessive obligations on foreign investors which violated Article 1105 of 
NAFTA (which contains the FET standard). The Tribunal addressed the relationship 
between the general objectives prescribed in the preamble of NAFTA and the specific 
provisions in subsequent chapters of the agreement. The Tribunal referred to them as lex 
genrealis and lex specialis, and concluded that the former may be seen as casting a light on 
the latter but that it should not be regarded as overriding and supersede the lex spexialis
rules of interpretation.159 An overemphasis on the lex generalis could in some instances go 
against the ordinary meaning of the lex specialis rules. While this reasoning is very 
eloquently formulated, it stands clear that the Tribunal is hesitant in utilizing the object and 
purpose in its interpretation. 
As an example to the dangers of overemphasizing the object and purpose, the finding by 
the Tribunal in Metalclad should be mentioned. Here, the Tribunal was faced with a 
question whether the absence of clear rules of procedure constituted a violation of the FET 
                                                                                                                                                   
Recognizing that the promotion and reciprocal protection of such investments on the basis of an Agreement 
will favour the expansion of the economic relations between the two Contracting Parties and stimulate 
investment initiatives…”
155 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Washington D.C. December 17, 1992. In force January 
1, 1994. Article 102(1) a) and b)
156 NAFTA Article 102(2)
157 Dumberry (2013), page 61
158 Id..
159 ADF v. United States, Award, (9 January 2003), para. 147. Other Tribunals have supported this. See for 
example: Canfor Corporation v. United States of America and Terminal Forest Products Ltd. v . United 
States of America (Decision on Preliminary question), para. 177-179.
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standard. In that case, the Tribunal came to a conclusion that “transparency” was part of 
the objectives of the agreement.160 Based on this, the Tribunal used the preamble of 
NAFTA in interpreting Article 1105. It found that Mexico had violated the FET standard
by not having respected the transparency requirement which obligated it to abide by the 
rules procedure.161 This award caused a significant controversy and was later partially set 
aside by the Supreme Court of British Columbia on the parts where there had been a 
violation of the FET standard based on the object and purpose.162 The Tribunal in question 
went beyond the limitations to its interpretive powers when it solely based the violation on 
the object and purpose. This is also an excellent example of how ignorance of the legal 
culture can lead to set-aside procedures like this. While there were no explicit rules on 
interpretation that would have prohibited the Tribunal from putting such an emphasis on 
the object and purpose, the Tribunal had nonetheless clearly transgressed unwritten rules of 
the legal culture.
In the light of object and purpose, there is another debate concerning the different 
approaches of restrictive and effective interpretation. The ICJ has concerned itself with the 
principle of effectiveness. In the Corfu Channel case of 1949, the Court stated that: 
It would indeed be incompatible with the generally accepted rules of 
interpretation to admit that a provision of this sort occurring in a Special 
Agreement should be devoid of purport or effect.163
The core of all interpretation in international law is usually attributed to the treaty text and 
an overarching principle of effectiveness.164 In practice, if a restrictive interpretation is 
applied, then whenever there is an ambiguity with provisions granting jurisdiction over 
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the Parties.”
161 Metalclad v. Mexico, Award, (30 August 2000, para. 74-76. This was a controversial award, which was 
later set aside by a the Supreme Court of British Columbia para. Mexico v. Metalclad, 2001 BCSC 664, 
Supreme Court of British Columbia, Judgment and Reasons for Decision (2 May 2001), 59-76
162 United Mexican States v Metalclad Corp, 2001 BCSC 655
163 Corfu Channel Case, (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), Judgement, 
I.C.J Rep. (1949),  p. 24
164 Michael Waibel Demystifying the Art of Interpretation, European Journal of International Law, page 581.
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disputes between states and individuals, such ambiguity should always be resolved by 
maintaining state sovereignty.165
According to the principle of effectiveness, treaty provisions should be interpreted in a way 
as to give it meaning.166 A more controversial reading of the principle would include a 
maxim that obligates the interpretation to give treaty provisions a “maximum effect.”167
Tribunals have adopted both the effective and restrictive ways of interpretation in 
investment disputes. A restrictive interpretation of investment treaties tends to favor the 
host state over the investor while an effective interpretation will favor the investor over the 
host state.168 While either one of these approaches can be used when interpreting a treaty 
provision, a far more favorable approach is a balanced approach that rejects an exclusive
application of either of these approaches.169 In Mondev v. the United States, the Tribunal 
argued that: 
In the Tribunal’s view, there is no principle either of extensive or restrictive 
interpretation of jurisdictional provisions in treaties. In the end the question 
is what the relevant provisions mean, interpreted in accordance with the 
applicable rules of interpretation of treaties170
The Tribunal in Mondev exemplified the more diverse nature of treaty interpretation that is 
not as easily compartmentalized in a specific way of interpretation. In addition to this, the 
idea that treaty provisions that limit state sovereignty need to be interpreted through a
restrictive approach has largely been rejected.171 This is mostly because the approach has 
been replaced by Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna convention.172
                                                
165 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America Partial Award (Preliminary Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility), para. 103. 
166 Schreuer (2011), page 1
167 Ibid., page 2
168 Id.
169 Schreuer (2011), page 2
170 Mondev v. United States, Award, (11 October 2002), para. 115. Here, the use of the word “extensive” is 
synonymous to “effective”.
171 Christoph Schreuer (2010), page 132. Many Tribunals have also dismissed the restrictive approach in their 
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Admissibility, (3 August 2005), para. 105 & Loewen v. United States, Award (26 June 2003), para. 51.
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In a dichotomy between the two, the principle of effectiveness is preferred in the 
international community.173
Tribunals that interpret through the object and purpose usually reach awards that lean in 
favor of effectiveness. 174 It is possible to conclude that the object and purpose give little
indication on how to interpret the FET standard. In the cases where a Tribunal has
supported a violation of the FET through the object and purpose, it has been controversial. 
Here, the reasoning made by ADF is compelling; the object and purpose can be relied upon 
if it supports the lex specialis rule in Article 1105. This ensures that the Tribunal avoids 
situations where the object and purpose are used in a manner that renders the FET standard 
unpredictable, as was the case in Metalclad.
4.2.3 Context
According to Article 31(1) of the VCLT, the context should be taken into account when 
interpreting the provisions of a treaty. This includes preambles and annexes as well as any 
subsequent agreements or instruments between the parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty.175 Other interaction between the parties, such as subsequent
practice or agreements of its interpretation should also be taken into account.176
The first contextual detail that is of significance is the title of the article that reads “Article 
1105 Minimum Standard of Treatment”. Some authors argue that this is a clear reference 
to customary international law.177 Therefore, the words “international law” mentioned 
                                                
173 As Lauterpacht argued, “Unlike the rule of restrictive interpretation of international obligations, the 
principle of effectiveness constitutes a general principle of law and a cogent requirement of good faith.” 
Lauterpacht (1949), page 83. See also separate opinion of Judge Higgins in the Oil Platforms Case, where she 
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177 See for example: Schreuer (2005), page 362.
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within the article could be read as an apparent reference to the minimum standard of 
treatment in international law.178
At the implementation of NAFTA, both the US and Canada made official statements on its 
implementation where they, among other things, equated Article 1105 with CILMSTA. 
While this could not be seen as subsequent agreements between the parties under Article
31(3)(a), it is possible to argue that this constitutes subsequent practice under Article
31(3)(b).179 A fact supporting this is that both states stand behind the same 
interpretation.180 The ICJ has reaffirmed this position in its Navigational and Related 
Rights case from 2009, where it is stated that Article 31(3)(b) allows for a departure from 
the original intent if there exists a tacit agreement between the parties.181 In IIA, however, 
Tribunals have not made the same connection. In Mondev, the Tribunal did not regard the 
official statements as a subsequent practice, rather it concluded that they serve as evidence 
for opinio juris.182
Another question with regards to the context concerns the interpretation of other BITs, 
especially Model BITs adopted by the parties to NAFTA and whether they can be said to 
influence the interpretation of the FET in article 1105. BITs that are more recent contain
specific language that explicitly refers to customary international law as well as providing 
a more narrow definition of the FET standard.183 Some writers argue that a Model BIT 
represents a set of norms that the drafting state deems to represent a reasonable and 
acceptable legal basis for the protection of foreign investments.184 Whether this constitutes 
subsequent practice is debatable, however, there is support for this among writers.185
The essential problem with this approach lies in the specific wording of the VCLT. Article
31(3)(b) allows for the interpretation of subsequent practice when it has been in connection 
with application of the treaty in question. However, other BITs as well as Model BITs have 
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no connection to NAFTA, and as such, they should not be used as a subsequent practice 
under the VCLT. 
Finally, as mentioned above, the context of an interpretation can in light of Article 31(3)(a) 
of the VCLT also include any subsequent agreement between the parties that concerns the 
interpretation of the treaty. These subsequent agreements will be binding on any court or 
tribunal whose task it is to interpret the treaty. A similar provision can be found in Article
1131(2) of NAFTA, where a Tribunal established under a chapter 11 dispute is bound by 
interpretations made by the North American Free Trade Commission (FTC).186 This is 
precisely what the parties to the NAFTA did in the early 2000s. As this event deserves a 
broader analysis, it will be discussed in the following subchapter.
4.2.3.1 The FTC’s Notes of Interpretation 
Article 1105(1) of NAFTA prescribes a minimum standard of treatment of foreign 
investors. The article contains a couple of controversial ambiguities that have sparked the 
extensive FET vs. CILMSTA debate. In short, the debate is whether the FET standard is 
part of CILMSTA, or whether it is something else that gives the investor higher
protection.187
First, the article mentions “in accordance with international law,” not customary 
international law. Here, the article is ambiguous on whether it is specifically CILMSTA 
that the minimum standard of treatment should accord to, or whether other sources of 
international law, such as general principles of law, could be used as an indicator of the 
standard. The second ambiguity is connected with the word “including.” Here, the debate 
is whether the article refers to the FET standard as an example of CILMSTA, or whether it 
is referred to as an autonomous example of a legal standard of treatment of investors in 
international law. Both of the ambiguities were clarified when the state parties to NAFTA 
issued a binding interpretation of Article 1105(1). 
On the 31st of July 2001, the FTC, consisting of the state parties to NAFTA, issued the 
notes of interpretation regarding Article 1105 where it stated that: 
                                                
186 According to Article 1131(2): An interpretation by the Commission of a provision of this Agreement shall 
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187 This will be further elaborated in chapter 4.
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“Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum 
standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be 
afforded to investments of investors of another Party.
… "fair and equitable treatment" … do not require treatment in addition to 
or beyond that which is required by the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens.“188
The notes contained several clarifications on issues that had been debated in Tribunals 
prior to their announcement. The issuance of the notes can be seen as a reaction to a 
number of arbitral awards, both concluded and pending, that had adopted an expansive 
reading of Article 1105.189
Prior to the issuance, three awards are of special importance. In Metalclad v Mexico, the 
issue concerned a revocation of a permit to construct a hazardous landfill in Mexico after it 
had already been constructed. As mentioned above, the Tribunal in Metalclad found that 
Article 1105 had breached since Mexico had failed to provide the investor a “transparent 
and predictable framework”.190 In SD Myers v Canada, the issue concerned a permission 
granted by Canada to the investor concerning the export of a hazardous chemical 
compound, which was later prohibited. The Tribunal found that there had been a violation 
of Article 1105 since Canada had breached the NT provision contained in Article 1102 of 
the agreement.191 Finally, in the Pope & Talbot v. Canada case, the issue concerned 
exports limitations of softwood lumber as well as additional fees for exports that went 
beyond the limitations. In its award, the Tribunal found that there had been a breach of the 
FET standard in Article 1105, and that the standard was “additive” to the minimum 
standard contained in international law.192
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Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions: A.1 and 2. According to Article 1131(2): An interpretation 
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The note dismissed most of the findings by the abovementioned Tribunals.193 The note 
took a firm stance on the relationship between the FET standard and CILMSTA, stating 
that the standard do not require any additional treatment beyond the CILMSTA. This was a 
directed at the findings by the Tribunal in Pope & Talbot, who had found that the standard 
was “additive” to the minimum standard. The FTC note also made it clear, that a violation 
of another provision in NAFTA does not constitute a breach of Article 1105, and thus 
dismissing the findings made by the Tribunal in SD Myers.194
Some authors speculate, that one of the main reasons why the FTC note was issued at this  
inconvenient time is due to the fear of the parties to NAFTA that the minimum standard 
was driven off from its course by “ambulance chasing” investment lawyers.195 Without a 
“re-interpretation” of the provisions in chapter 11, it is speculated that the NAFTA parties 
were concerned that the findings by the abovementioned Tribunals would set a trend that 
other Tribunals would follow in the future.196
To some writers, the FTC note can be regarded as an (successful) attempt to “change the 
ground rules in mid-game”.197 This method of obtaining authentic interpretations of the 
Treaty’s meaning through an institutional mechanism has serious drawbacks.198 It gives 
States the possibility to influence proceedings to which they are parties. According to 
Schreuer (2011), this mechanism is incompatible with principles of a fair procedure, which 
renders the whole process undesirable.199 The main problem is the dual identity that the 
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state party to a dispute has in the proceedings.200 It acts both as a litigant of its own case as 
well as a member to the FTC, which at any point in time has the authority to issue binding 
interpretations on the specific provisions in NAFTA, even those that are being disputed.201
Another problematic aspect is the distinction between interpretation and modification. 
While all the members of the FTC claimed that the Note was an interpretation according to 
Article 1131(2) of NAFTA, it is still unclear whether the interpretation actually constitutes 
a clarification of the meaning, or whether it de facto represents a modification of the 
provisions, which would constitute an ultra vires amendment without any binding force. 202
Even if the Note is to be considered to contain some binding force, it is doubtful whether 
they apply retroactively on existing disputes.203 Brower II (2001) points out, that while 
there is no specific prohibition against retroactive application, Article 1131(1) still requires 
that the disputes are decided in accordance with international law. 204 Therefore, this 
practice could nonetheless be considered contrary to the principle “nemo judex in causa 
sua” (direct transl. “no-one should be a judge in his own case”).205
Finally, the FTC note can be regarded as an attempt to reconnect the FET standard with 
CILMSTA. It also sheds light on an ongoing struggle between states and Tribunals over 
the final power to interpret the investment treaty and its subsequent provisions.206. It is 
possible to speculate whether the equation of the FET standard with CILMSTA means that 
the FET standard is “submerged” to CILMSTA or whether the states regards the minimum 
standard as having evolved and risen to the level of the FET standard. The wording of the 
reinterpretation, especially the usage of sentences such as “in addition or beyond that 
which is required by that [CILMSTA] standard”, and “do not create additional substantive 
rights” does not give one much encouragement to these speculations. It is fairly clear that 
FET standard has been “submerged” to the level of CILMSTA. 
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4.2.3.2 The implications by the FTC note on the FET-CILMSTA relationship
As mentioned above, the FTC note equated the FET standard to CILMSTA. 207 This was in 
direct opposition to the findings in Pope & Talbot, where the Tribunal had found that the 
FET standard constituted something “additive” to the CILMSTA.208
As the FTC note “corrected” their conclusions, it reaffirmed that the reference to 
international law was actually a reference to customary international law. One might ask 
what the importance is in pointing out the difference. Judge Schwebel has argued that 
international law, by going beyond customary international law, includes conventions and 
treaties that encompass a load of almost 3000 BITs.209 While the sources for proving the 
standard in customary international law are limited and hard to prove, the ability to use 
general practice in BITs would significantly lighten the investors burden of proof.
It is well recognized in international law, that if a party relies on a rule of customary 
international law, it is first obligated to establish that the custom is binding on the other 
party.210 Trough the FTC note, the investor who is claiming a breach of the FET standard
under NAFTA is, in fact, claiming that there has been a breach of a rule in customary 
international law. In turn, this means that the investor needs to prove both state practice 
and opinio juris, and that the alleged breach in the individual case amounts to a breach of 
the customary international law rule. This is problematic for the investor, as the bar is 
usually set high for there to be a breach of these rules in customary international law. 
What is interesting is that the new interpretation was issued in the middle of the 
proceedings between Mondev v. the United States, where one of the critical issues at hand 
was precisely Article 1105 (1) of NAFTA. While the investor did not dispute the right of 
the state parties to issue binding interpretations by Article 1131 of NAFTA, they argued 
that this right should conform to good faith when interpreting and applying the treaties.211
The US position in Mondev was that all previous awards where the FET standard had been 
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considered as additive to the minimum standard in customary international law were 
erroneous interpretations of Article 1105 (1). 212
After the FTC had issued its notes of interpretation, the whole discussion on whether there 
existed a difference between the FET standard and the minimum standard of treatment was
retired mainly as the Tribunals amended their interpretations by the Note. In Methanex, the 
Tribunal contended that: 
In the light of these factors, the Tribunal has no difficulty in deciding that the 
FTC’s Interpretation of 31st July 2001 is properly characterized as a 
“subsequent agreement” on interpretation falling within the scope of Article 
31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention.213
The main success from the perspective of the state parties to NAFTA was thus that a) the 
FET standard did not give any additional protection to investors than that which was 
protected under CILMSTA which b) significantly increased the investor’s burden of proof. 
The actual content of the CILMSTA will be discussed further in chapter 5. 
4.3 Vienna Convention of the Law of the Treaties, Article 32
Article 32 of the VCLT prescribes for supplementary means of interpretation. These 
supplementary means should only confirm the interpretation of primary means of 
interpretation prescribed in Article 31 of the VCLT.214 According to Article 32, 
supplementary means of interpretation may also be used when an interpretation according 
to Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous, obscure or renders the whole result of the 
interpretation absurd or unreasonable.215 In the following subchapters, it will be analyzed
how the supplementary means of interpretation has been taken into account in IIA.
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4.3.1 Travaux Préparatoires
According to Article 32 of the VCLT, a Tribunal may have recourse to preparatory works 
when interpreting a treaty.216
In the context of NAFTA, Tribunals have referred to the preparatory works of the 
agreement.217 However, before the Free Trade Commission published the negotiation 
history of chapter 11 in 2004, the de facto possibility for a claimant to present arguments 
based on the preparatory works were limited.218 This was argued by the Claimant in in 
Methanex, who challenged the fact that the US had made a case about the “historical 
context” of Article 1105 before the Tribunal.219 This was arguably unfair, as the US had 
the benefit of having exclusive access to the drafting material, that in turn made it 
impossible for the Claimant to make a reasonable counter-argument. However, the US 
argued that the Claimant had failed to show the materiality of the preparatory works, 
maintaining that it the requirements set out in Article 32 had not been met.220 The Tribunal 
sided with the US in arguing that the Claimant had not sufficiently established why 
interpretation according to Article 31 of the VCLT would have reached the criteria laid out 
in Article 32 of the VCLT.221 In general, the Tribunal expressed its reservation against 
Article 32 in stating that: 
“…[P]ursuant to Article 32, recourse may be had to supplementary means of 
interpretation only in the limited circumstances there specified. Other than that, the 
approach of the Vienna Convention is that the text of the treaty is deemed to be the 
authentic expression of the intentions of the parties; and its elucidation, rather than 
wide-ranging searches for the supposed intentions of the parties, is the proper object 
of interpretation.”222
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It is clear that the preconditions in Article 32 need to be met before one can have recourse 
to preparatory works. However, the restrictive approach by the Tribunal should 
nonetheless be put under further scrutiny. Article 32 states that “Recourse may be had to 
supplementary means of interpretation … in order to confirm the meaning resulting from 
the application of article 31…”. However, this only applies to interpretation. The problem 
in the abovementioned case was that the Claimant was not allowed to get access to the 
preparatory works due to its inability to prove that one of the three conditions of Article 32 
was met. The Tribunal mixes up the right to review the preparatory norms and the right to 
use them as a supplementary means of interpretation. Since most of the preparatory works 
are accessible to all parties to NAFTA chapter 11 proceedings today, this question is 
largely settled.
The Tribunal in Pope & Talbot took another approach by arguing that the negotiating 
history was necessary to interpret the FET standard since Article 1105 contained 
ambiguities in the mind of the Tribunal.223 It concluded that the preparatory work did not 
support Canada’s claim that the words “international law” contained in Article 1105 were 
references to customary international law.224
Despite this, it is questionable whether the interpretation of the FET standard is ambiguous 
to the extent that it would justify having recourse to the preparatory works.225 Article 32 of 
the VCLT is aimed at situations where there exist no other sources from which the 
interpretative body can draw definite conclusions. As it can be witnessed especially 
through the FTC note, all the parties to the agreement have been very active in utilizing 
different ways of clarifying the content of the provision, which prima facie renders Article 
32 superfluous. 
4.3.2 Interpretive Authority of Previous Awards
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, Tribunals can rely on subsidiary means of 
interpretation in determining primary sources.226 These subsidiary means include previous 
awards by investment Tribunals. A coherent case law strengthens both the predictability 
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and authority of decisions and Tribunals are increasingly referring to and discussing earlier 
awards.227 While the process is slow, some writers argue that there is a progressive 
emergence of more concrete rules through the emergence of consistent cases within certain
issues.228
As there is no rule of stare decisis in IIA, an award given by a Tribunal constitutes an ad 
hoc decision between two disputing parties. 229 In NAFTA this has even been made 
explicit, since Article 1136(1) states, “An award made by a Tribunal shall have no binding 
force except between the disputing parties and in respect of the particular case.”230 This
closely resembles the statute of ICJ, which states, “The decision of the Court has no 
binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.”231
Nonetheless, Tribunals do make references to other Tribunals in their awards. This is 
especially the case when interpreting the FET standard. Of course, it is impossible to say to 
which degree other Tribunals influence arbitrators, but the number of references to other 
awards speak for themselves. 
The relationship towards previous awards has been discussed in several cases.232 In Glamis 
Gold, the Tribunal stated that 
“…[A] NAFTA tribunal, while recognizing that there is no precedential effect given 
to previous decisions, should communicate its reasons for departing from major 
trends present in previous decisions, if it chooses to do so.”233
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In the case at hand, the Tribunal was especially referring to its departure from the “major 
trends” established around the interpretation of the FET standard in Article 1105.234 This is 
a very sound approach when concerned with the predictability of the awards. However, it 
is questionable whether Tribunals feel this sense of obligation when departing from “major 
trends.” In the Feldman case, for example, the Tribunal did not mention “major trends” 
when discussing previous awards, rather, it argued that it was the fact that the parties had 
relied extensively on previous awards that made it appropriate to discuss them.235Despite 
this, it is undoubtedly the case that Tribunals are influenced by previous awards, and as it 
will become apparent in the next chapter, the interpretation of the FET standard is a 
product of extensive discussion between the Tribunals that have applied it. It is safe to say 
that the legal culture surrounding the interpretation and application is “live and kicking” 
meaning that Tribunals are clearly conscious of their surrounding legal culture and are 
consequently influenced by it to a certain degree.
While it is not possible to talk about a clear and consistent case law within IIA, topical 
issues such as a violation of the FET standard seem to at least pull many arbitrators in the 
same direction.  For example, many Tribunals have consistently abandoned bad faith as a 
precondition for reaching the threshold of a violation of the FET standard, which could 
serve as proof of some internal consistency.236 On the other hand, some writers criticize the 
integral unpredictability of IIA which remains unaffected by consistent case law.237 They 
argue that it is not so much the lack of invoking previous awards as precedents that is the 
cause of the lack of predictability; it is instead the categorically weak reasoning that is 
integral to the interpretation and application of the standard.238 On this point, I regard 
consistency as supportive of predictability, regardless of quality in the reasoning. As I
mentioned in the beginning, rules and their application are ideally predictable in a good
way. Here, rules and their application are based on codified behavior that is already being 
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acted out by the community, which automatically renders the rules predictable. Then there 
is another way predictability, where the rule is not based on codified behavior but instead
on the individual discretion of the agent in power. Here, the rule and its application can 
indeed be consistent and as such function as a predictable rule for future conduct. In this 
case, it is obviously preferable that the FET standard be predictable in a good way. It will 
be the object of the following two chapters to determine, whether the reasoning really is 
that weak and whether the FET standard can be regarded as something that is already being 
acted out among states.
5 Specific Interpretation the FET Standard
When disputing about the relationship between the two standards, there is a presumption 
that, if they are separate, the CILMSTA requires a serious violation by the state while the 
FET standard is more sensitive of the investor’s rights. The “notes of interpretation”
resolved this inherent ambiguity, as it clarified that the FET standard was included in the 
minimum standard of treatment. However, the note did not clarify what the standard is.
With regards to the theoretical approach, the purpose of this chapter is to find a definition, 
or to outline, “hole in the net.” It will try to familiarize with the legal culture where 
Tribunals, states and investors have attempted at defining the FET standard. As it was 
clarified in chapter 4.2.3.1, the FET standard has been equated to the CILMSTA, and as 
such, this chapter will be satisfied in providing an abstract definition of what the 
CILMSTA is.239
The definition of CILMSTA is highly dependent on whom one asks. If one turns towards 
the state, the standard will undoubtedly be connected with the strict “egregious” standard 
that was coined in the Neer case. Understandably, investors argue in favor of a liberal 
interpretation of the standard while Tribunals are stuck between these opposing views.
5.1 The Autonomous Approach and “Ex Aqueo et Bono”
Before moving into the discussion on the definition of CILMSTA, this chapter will give a 
brief overview of the autonomous approach that was prevalent before the FTC note. This 
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approach can still be witnessed in investment arbitration that concerns BITs which have 
not amended the wording in the provision that limits the FET standard to CILMSTA. 240
The autonomous approach is a way of interpreting the FET standard where the words are 
given a literal meaning. It is therefore a straightforward assessment of whether the 
treatment of an investor has been both “fair” and “equitable.”241 The autonomous approach 
is supported by the fact that fair and equitable treatment has usually been pronounced
without any subsequent clarifications, which would support the idea that the expression is 
so readily understood that states have agreed on the meaning and that it should as such be 
understood in its literal sense.242 Arguably, this is also supported by the rules of 
interpretation in international law.243
The main problems with this approach are that different legal cultures might have a 
different understanding of the meaning of “fair” and “equitable.” The second problem is 
the subjective nature of the interpretation. This approach does not support its interpretation 
of an established body of law, rather the plain meaning of the FET standard is only drawn 
from the factual situation which in turn risks conflicting interpretations in practice.244
Therefore, this approach gives the arbitrators free hands to apply the FET as a subjective
standard. There is strong critique against this, as the decision of the tribunal would allgedly
in this case be de facto given trough “ex aqueo et bono” which would go against NAFTA 
1131(1) and Article 42(3) of the ICSID Convention.245 It is hard to delimit the difference 
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between judging after “what is right and good” and judging according to the literal 
meaning of “fair” and “equitable.”
There is a contrary way of looking at this problem. It is possible to take the view that the 
FET standard does not in fact, like ex aqueo et bono, allow for the arbitrator to apply the 
standard subjectively by merely basing the award on his or her idiosyncrasies.246 The FET 
standard does not allow for an “open-ended mandate to second guess government decision 
making,” rather, it grants the arbitrators the discretion to decide what has constituted an
unreasonable act.247 This view takes the position that the FET standard provides higher
protection than the minimum standard, in that both require the state conduct to display 
inappropriateness, but the FET standard requires a relatively lower degree of the 
inappropriateness.248
It is questionable whether this makes any difference in reality. We could once again refer
to the famous expression “law is what judges do rather than what they say they do.”
Ultimately, the arbitrator has to decide based on the specific facts of the case, what is 
unreasonable in his mind. One could argue that there merely exists a semantic difference to 
deciding the matter ex aqueo et bono. This does not mean that the awards would be 
arbitrary or unpredictable, far from it. It is more a question of the theory and attitude of 
how the judicial community views arbitrators. 249
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As mentioned above, the FTC commission included the FET standard with CILMSTA, and 
as such, it is not necessary to elaborate on the autonomous approach any further.250 The 
next discussion, however, is where the threshold for the minimum standard exists.
5.2 The Definition of the Minimum Standard
The state parties to NAFTA have consistently advocated that the interpretation of the FET 
standard should follow the Neer interpretation, regardless of the factual circumstances in 
the case.251 The Neer interpretation is a reference to a test applied in the Neer Case, 
adjudicated by the General Claims Commission between the US and Mexico.252 In that 
case, the issue concerned the death of an American citizen, Paul Neer, who had been killed 
by a group of armed men. While the culprits had no connection to the Mexican 
government, the family of Mr. Neer argued that the “Mexican authorities showed an 
unwarrantable lack of diligence or an unwarrantable lack of intelligent investigation in 
prosecuting the culprits.”253 The General Claims Commission dismissed the claim against 
the Mexican state, as the acts had not reached the threshold of state responsibility:
“The propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of international 
standards. The treatment of an alien, in order to constitute an international
delinquency should amount to an outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of 
duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of 
international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would 
readily recognise its insufficiency.” [Emphasis added]254
This test functioned as a standard for other awards as well.255 The Neer standard is seen as 
portraying the “egregiousness” which is required from the action of the state. The US has 
pleaded for the application of this test in all cases brought against it under NAFTA.256 This
constitutes the starting point in the discussion of the threshold for the minimum standard. 
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The crucial question is, therefore, whether customary international law has evolved since 
1926 or whether the same standard still applies today, as it has been frozen in time?
5.2.1 The Frozen Customary International Law
In Glamis v. the United States, the Tribunal argued that it was the Claimants burden to 
prove that the minimum standard has evolved and as such requires less than the 
“egregious,” “outrageous” or “shocking” standard set out in Neer.257 The case concerned a 
Canadian corporation engaged in mining, which had allegedly suffered injuries due to 
governmental regulations that had effectively denied its investments the minimum standard 
of treatment according to Article 1105. The Tribunal pointed out that proving that
customary international law has changed is difficult, and the investor's failure to prove it 
effectively freezes the protections provided in Article 1105 to the standards of 
“egregiousness” expressed in the Neer case.258
In determining the evolution of the standard, the Tribunal limited the progress to two 
possible types, (1) that the CILMSTA has moved beyond what it was in 1926 or (2) the 
public views on “outrageous” may have changed over time.259 The Tribunal rejected the 
first type of evolution of the standard due to the abundant use of adjective modifiers in 
contemporary arbitration, such as “gross denial of justice” or “manifest arbitrariness,” that
evidenced a strict standard similar to that which was expressed in the Neer case.260 It 
pointed out that the CILMSTA is, in fact, a minimum standard, and in that sense, the level 
of scrutiny is the same as it was in the 1920s.261
The Tribunal asserted that the FET standard is subject to the second type of evolution, 
namely that there has been a change in the international view of what constitutes 
“shocking” and “outrageous.”262 It supported its argumentation on the Mondev award, 
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where the Tribunal in question pointed out that the Neer was decided at a time when the 
status of protecting both individuals and foreign investments was far less developed than 
they have since come to be.263 The Glamis Tribunal agreed with this, as it held that when 
applying the Neer standard, it is possible that the general public might find events shocking 
and outrageous that might not have reached this level in the past.264
Based on this, the Glamis Tribunal came to an interesting solution. On the one hand, the 
fundamentals of the Neer standard, requiring that acts are “outrageous” or “shocking,” was 
still applicable while on the other hand, the meaning of “outrageous” and “shocking” has 
indeed changed over time since the Neer case. 265 This allows for the Tribunal to reject the 
notion that custom has changed since Neer while at the same time adopting a liberal 
interpretation of what can be considered as outrageous and shocking by today’s standards.
One could argue, that the approach taken in Glamis is indeed an evolved interpretation that 
has been made to look like the rigid standard formulated in the Neer case. As one writer 
points out 
“[t]he veracity of this premise will ultimately depend on how each tribunal 
evaluates changes in mentality towards what it considers to be ‘egregious' 
and ‘shocking.’”266
Another example of interpreting the standard as “frozen in time” was argued by the 
Tribunal in Cargill Inc. v. Mexico. The Tribunal took a similar approach as the Glamis
Tribunal when it observed that there was a trend towards adopting the standard formulated 
in Neer to more complicated contemporary economic situations.267 The Tribunal still 
maintained that the severity of the conduct still needed to reach the standard formulated in 
Neer.268 The Cargill Tribunal did not comment on whether the notions of “shocking” or 
“outrageous” had evolved to current standards. However, it still held that the FET standard 
at least reflects an adoption of the Neer standard to current conditions. This was because all 
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concrete violations of the standard, such as denial of justice, have to be “‘gross,'
‘manifest,’ ‘complete,’ or such as to ‘offend judicial propriety.”.269
In conclusion, the term “frozen” might be a misleading word for describing this 
interpretive approach. It is clear that no Tribunal is ready to apply the Neer standard by 
pretending to go back in time to the 20s. Rather, the “frozenness” refers to a strict standard 
that requires serious misconduct by the state for it to be responsible. It should be 
mentioned that the ICJ has also dealt with the question of the evolution of the
interpretation of treaties. In the Aegean Sea judgment, decided in 1978, the Court argued 
that in cases where a state commits itself to a specific course of action (in that case the 
issue concerned territorial status), there is a presumption that the meaning of the 
expressions used in the commitment is meant to follow both the evolution of the law as 
well as the contemporary meaning attached to the expression by the law in force.270 This 
reasoning seems to be in line with the approach adopted by Glamis Gold. It is important to 
notice that the meaning of a rule can evolve while still staying the same. A good example 
of this is voting equality. While the same principle of equality among voters still applies, 
the contemporary meaning is widely different than it was a hundred years ago. That is also 
the case in Glamis Gold. The “gist” with the Neer approach is that it reflects the action 
with the reaction of the international community. The reaction by “every reasonable and 
impartial man” is a concept that refers to a commonsensical way of determining whether 
an act is good or bad.271 In this way, it is justified to argue that the Neer approach has 
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evolved to adapt to the “contemporary reactions” of the world community while still 
staying faithful to the ordinary expressions in the Neer case.
5.2.2 The Evolved Customary International Law
Some Tribunals have rejected the standard applied in the Neer case. In Mondev, the 
Tribunal pointed out that the Neer approach did not suffice as a standard of treatment in 
investment disputes since the circumstances in the Neer case were completely different.272
The Tribunal also pointed out that the substantial and procedural rights of the individual 
has developed significantly in international law and came to the conclusion that modern
conceptions of unfair and inequitable actions might not be equated with that which was 
outrageous in the 1920s.273 How then, in the Tribunals view, should the FET be defined? 
At the moment, the Tribunal had merely stated of what the standard did not consist.274 In 
an attempt to define the FET standard, the Tribunal argued that a judgment of which 
actions are in accordance with the FET standard cannot be reached in the abstract; rather it 
must be dependent on the facts of the particular case.275 It is reasonable to assume that the 
Tribunal wanted to avoid the risk of sounding like it was supporting an ex aqueo et bono
interpretation of the standard. This is because the Tribunal added that it was indeed bound 
by the minimum standard established by state practice and jurisprudence of arbitral awards 
and underlined that a Tribunal could not “adopt its own idiosyncratic standard of what is 
“fair” or “equitable,” without reference to established sources of law.”276
The Tribunal in ADF concurred with the findings in Mondev and argued that there be no 
logical connection why the standard applied in Neer should be extendible to contemporary 
treatment of foreign investors by host states.277 Both Tribunals argued that custom could
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not be limited to the 1920s and as such that the minimum standard is in a constant process 
of development.278 Many later Tribunals have endorsed this approach.279
The evolution of custom is undoubtedly a fact.280 However, the problem lies in the lack of 
any further elaboration of what this evolution entails. A majority of Tribunals have 
concluded that the minimum standard has evolved simply by recognizing that
contemporary custom, entailed in the minimum standard, is affected by the extensive 
network of BITs.281 First of all, the definition of the FET standard in other BITs is equally 
vague, and many clauses do not have the same wording as expressed in Article 1105,
where the FTC’s interpretative note clearly emphasized the importance of every word. 
Second, while the vast network of BITs might prove the existence of state practice, this 
does not indicate opinio juris on its own.282 Neither Mondev nor ADF have taken upon 
themselves to analyze state practice and opinio juris that would show the evolution of the 
standard.283 Many authors have argued that investment Tribunals have efficiently
circumvented the FTC note by making the CILMSTA itself more flexible and by doing 
this, they have expanded their power.284
In the case of investment protection, few are disputing that there exists state practice. For
us to conclude that BITs can be used as evidence of existing customary international law, it 
would have to be shown that the reason states sign BITs is either to conform to a legal 
obligation or, more specifically, to clarify what the legal obligation is. The argument here 
is that states signs BITs to clarify investment protection standards that already exist as a 
part of customary international law. 
In Mondev, the Tribunal noted that states had obliged themselves on a widespread basis to 
accord foreign investment treatment to the standards of fair and equitable treatment.285
This led the Tribunal to conclude, “Such a body of concordant practice will necessarily 
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have influenced the content of rules governing the treatment of foreign investment in 
current international law.”286
The main opponents to the suggestions about emerging customary international law argue 
that there is a lack of opinio juris. 
“The repetition of common clauses in bilateral treaties does not create or 
support an inference that those clauses express customary law [...] To sustain 
such a claim of custom one would have to show that apart from the treaty 
itself, the rules in the clauses are considered obligatory”.287
It could be argued that states recognize the existence of the FET standard as a rule
contained in customary international law, and as such they merely include the FET 
standard as a way of codifying an already existing opinio juris. 
There is no reason to draw a definite conclusion on the question. Some authors have 
suggested an alternative that lies somewhere in the middle. In a dispute between a state and 
an investor, where there does not exist a BIT between the host and the home state, the 
Tribunal could take into account other BITs that the host state has concluded and in this 
regard apply them as “evidence of that states understanding of international law.”288
However, in the context of NAFTA, this approach does not support the argument that the 
worldwide network of BITs could be taken as collective evidence for the existence of a 
singular, unified opinio juris. 
In light of the abovementioned debate around the definition of the FET standard, one 
definitive conclusion that can be drawn is the high threshold that the standard requires of 
the acts. This is even more the case after the FTC note that effectively included the FET 
standard in CILMSTA, which made the standard formulated in the Neer case as the 
primary point of reference when it comes to determining severity. While some Tribunals 
questioned the how the Neer case bears any relevancy in customary international law, they 
nonetheless adhered to the test of the international community. This is also the main
takeaway of the Neer standard, as it sets out a metric for the international culpability of the 
act prohibited by FET and CILMSTA. The standard formulates a theoretical situation in 
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which the arbitrator should imagine how the general community would receive the 
culpable acts in question. It is by no means enough that the act simply “raises some 
eyebrows,” but that it has to be characterized as something “egregious,” “outrageous,” or 
“shocking.”289 From a theoretical point of view, it is therefore obvious that the FET 
standard does not protect the investor from normal business-related risks. In addition to 
this, the investor is neither protected acts that might be considered as having been 
conducted in bad faith insofar as the acts fall short of something “egregious,” 
“outrageous,” or “shocking” to the impartial individual.
6 Application of the FET Standard
So far, the thesis has been concerned with the theoretical interpretation of the FET 
standard. The discussion on the minimum standard of treatment and the different degrees 
of “outrageousness” has been an attempt to clarify the theoretical threshold for violation 
the standard. This chapter will move into a more concrete part of its application. Here, the 
focus is on how the standard is applied in concrete cases. This is where the fact of the cases 
will touch with the standard. Hopefully, this will give a better understanding of what 
constitutes “ or “egregious” s in reality. As the Mondev tribunal pointed out, “[a] judgment
of what is fair and equitable cannot be reached in the abstract; it must depend on the facts 
of the particular case.”290 From a theoretical point of view, this chapter moves into the 
phase of defining the “lines in the net,” which localize the boundaries of the standard. The
standard is divided into different sub-elements. They serve the purpose of giving a concrete 
conceptualization of the standard.
Before moving into the substantial material regarding the standard, it is necessary to clarify 
that there are many different concrete elements of the FET standard. These elements have 
materialized by being applied by Tribunals. The relationship between the FET standard
and the subsequent elements can be defined as an “umbrella concept incorporating a set of 
rules that has crystallized over the centuries into customary international law in specific 
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contexts.”291 The specific elements are concrete ways in which the FET standard is 
actualized.292
The following elements of the FET standard are: legitimate expectations, transparency, the 
principle of good faith and due process. This is a non-exhaustive list and the different 
categories may differ depending on the Treaty, author and Tribunal.293 This is important to 
note since many BITs and FTAs do not mention the specific subcategories just listed. 
Schill (2009) points out that Tribunals treat the elements of the FET standard ‘as if they 
constituted an authoritative interpretation by the contracting parties and were binding 
upon the Tribunal.’
In the following chapters, this thesis analyses the central elements that constitute the core 
of the FET standard. The purpose of going through these elements is not to provide a 
detailed guideline of how the elements have been put to action in concrete cases; rather the 
aim is to give different perspectives from which reoccurring tendencies in the legal culture 
can be extracted.294
6.1 Due Process
The FET standard embodies the requirement that a host state has to treat foreign investors
by the rule of law.295 Due process is a critical component in the concept of the rule of law
and constitutes a stand-alone element of the FET standard.296 A stand-alone element means 
that a violation of this element constitutes a direct violation of the FET standard (as 
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opposed to situations where several elements need to be breached for a violation of the 
FET standard). In general, if the investor has not been given due process, this constitutes a 
denial of justice which in turn constitutes a breach of the FET standard.297 A violation of 
the investor’s right to due process is one of the least contested and at the same time the 
most popular ground for proving a violation of the standard.298 While many due process 
claims concern administrative proceedings, a large part of the claims are made in 
connection with another element of the FET standard, including transparency and bad 
faith.299
In this chapter, due process has been divided into two subcategories, procedural and 
substantial denial of justice. Procedural denial of justice refers to situations where 
procedural guarantees of a legal procedure (administrative or judicial) have been 
disregarded. Substantial denial of justice concerns situations where the application of rules 
and regulations has been arbitrary or discriminatory. These categories are not absolute, and 
there exists some overlap between them. 
6.1.1 Procedural Denial of Justice
This subchapter deals with the procedural dimension of due process. It ensures that the 
actor who is the subject of the state’s coercive powers should receive a notice of the 
intended actions by the state as well as a possibility to contest the actions in front of an 
impartial tribunal.300 Another way of defining it could be by stating that procedural due 
process guarantees access to justice, a guarantee on a fair procedure as well as a general 
prohibition against denial of justice.301 Dolzer and Schreuer (2012) argue that these 
guarantees relate to three stages in the process, namely the right to bring a claim, the right 
to be fairly treated during the process as well as the right to an appropriate decision and the 
enforcement of it.302
                                                
297 As such, denial of justice can be considered ”the dark side” of due process. While it can be argued 
whether the they complement each other perfectly, this is the assumption taken in this thesis in the interest of 
length.
298 Diehl (2012), page 437.
299 Id.
300 Vandevelde (2010), page 49-50 and Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), page 154.
301 Vandevelde (2010), page 50.
302 Dolzer & Schreuer (2012), page 179.
62
To gain a better understanding of due process, understanding what a procedural denial of 
justice entails is necessary. In Azinian v. Mexico, the Tribunal provided a comprehensive 
definition of denial of justice.303 The Tribunal argued that:
“A denial of justice could be pleaded if the relevant courts refuse to entertain 
a suit, if they subject it to undue delay, or if they administer justice in a 
seriously inadequate way.”304
The following sections will go through two examples where an investor has alleged a 
breach of its right to due process. Despite this, there have been many cases where 
Tribunals have assessed the question and relationship between due process and the FET 
standard.305
6.1.1.1 Mondev v. the United States
The first case is Mondev v. the United States. The dispute arose between a Canadian real-
estate developing company, Mondev International Ltd., and its joint venture partner Sefrius 
Corporation, and the city of Boston (“the City”), all of whom had entered a tripartite 
agreement concerning the construction of a department store in the city. The development 
of the area consisted of two phases. In accordance with the agreement, phase I included the 
construction of a shopping mall, a hotel and a parking garage.306 Phase II of the project 
included the construction of additional retail spaces, a department store and an office 
building which were to be located on parcels of land that were adjacent to those used in 
phase I.307
The tripartite agreement included the exclusive option for the investor to buy the property, 
the “Hayward Parcel,” where the constructions in phase II were to be built. The conditions 
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304 Ibid. para. 102-103. Earlier sources define it as: “Denial of justice exists when there is a denial, 
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for the options were that: a) the City had decided to demolish the existing construction on 
the property in question and b) the investor notified the City within a three year period of 
its intention to buy the property.308 When the City decided to demolish the construction on 
the Hayward Parcel, the investor accordingly notified the City of its intention to buy the 
property. However, the City took to “obstructionist tactics” to delay the selling of the 
parcel. According to the investor, these tactics were largely orchestrated by the Mayor of 
Boston as he believed that the price that had been agreed to in the Tripartite Agreement did 
not reflect the market price at the time.309
As the City had essentially refused to sell the parcel to it, the investor was forced to sell its 
interest in the project to another company, Campeau Corp. To the detriment of the 
investor, the City further refused to accept the transfer the right of ownership to Campeau 
Corp., which eventually resulted in that the investor was forced to enter into a less valuable
lease agreement with the Corporation.310
Consequently, the investor started proceedings against the City in the courts of 
Massachusetts. The jury in the case decided in favor of the investor, although the verdict 
was not enforced as the Court upheld that the Respondent partially enjoyed statutory 
immunity and partially that the Claimant had not been able to prove that it was willing and 
able to perform its contractual obligations.311
In the dispute, the Claimant argued that the US had breached the FET standard by both a 
procedural and a substantive denial of justice.312 The Claimant specifically focused on the 
judicial proceedings following the breach of the tripartite agreement. The Claimant pointed 
out that the appeals court reversed the verdict by the jury by “substituting its own version 
and interpretation of the facts” without hearing the facts or witnesses presented in the 
earlier proceedings.313 This was despite the fact that a jury had explicitly found that the 
investor had fulfilled its contractual obligations while the City had not. More specifically, 
the Claimant argued that the appeals court contradicted its own settled precedent practice
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by deciding not to return the case to a jury but instead decided by its review that the 
investor was not relieved of its contractual obligations in the agreement despite the City’s 
clear breach of the Tripartite agreement.314
In addition to this, the Claimant argued that the appeals court had created radically new 
rules of contract law, which it then applied on the investor’s claim retroactively, despite the 
fact that the City had not even argued on the application or existence of such rules.315
The final claim made by the Claimant was that the courts had granted the City’s sovereign 
immunity claim despite the fact that the City had been engaged in a commercial activity
(which excludes immunity). The jury had already found the City guilty of violating the 
tripartite agreement by awarding the investor $6.4 million because of the City’s intentional 
interference with the sales agreement with Campeau Corp. However, the Courts denied the 
investor’s recovery rights based on the sovereign immunity claims by the City, which
precluded its responsibility.316 The Claimant argued that sovereign immunity could be 
waived at any time; “either expressly or by conduct”317 The Claimant argued that the City 
had waived its immunity on two grounds. First, that it had vigorously participated in the 
proceedings and only after the close of the evidence trial had the City submitted its 
immunity claim. Second, that according to a well-established principle of international law,
a sovereign waives its immunity when it engages in commercial activity.318 The decision 
by the appeals court to uphold the City’s immunity claim therefore constituted a procedural 
denial of justice as it a) allowed the City to escape its liability of the bad faith actions it had 
taken against the investor in the capacity of a commercial contracting party and b) it made 
it impossible for the investor to rely on any possible remedies against the City.319
The Tribunal first assessed the nature of a denial of justice claim. It reiterated the findings 
in Azinian v Mexico and stressed the fact that the Tribunal should not be regarded as a 
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fourth instance. Here, the Tribunal found it useful to turn to the Elsi case where the ICJ had 
applied a criterion that was equally useful in the context of determining a denial of justice.
The ICJ had rejected the claims made by the US in stating that:
“Arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as something 
opposed to the rule of law … It is a willful disregard of due process of law, an act 
which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of judicial propriety.”[Emphasis 
added]320
Here, the Tribunal pointed out that its duty was therefore not to determine whether the acts 
of the appeals court had been surprising, rather the test was whether:
“[T]he shock or surprise occasioned to an impartial tribunal leads, on reflection, 
to justified concerns as to the judicial propriety of the outcome, bearing in mind on 
the one hand that international tribunals are not courts of appeal, and on the other 
hand that Chapter 11 of NAFTA (like other treaties for the protection of 
investments) is intended to provide a real measure of protection”321
It is worth noting the various components in the standard of review, which the Tribunal 
applied in this case. It contains the usual component of the Neer standard with regards to 
the community of an impartial judiciary and the analysis of its reaction to the alleged 
infringements.322 Furthermore, the Tribunal included the reasoning by the ICJ in the Elsi
case, in an attempt to elaborate on the required seriousness, or the “egregiousness”, of the 
unlawful acts. Like in Elsi, it is not single acts of unlawfulness that elicit a violation of the 
international standard, rather it is serious acts that go against the rule of law itself. 323 As 
pointed out by the Tribunal in Loewen, there are no “perfect trials” and to that extent, 
Courts and Tribunals should apply doctrines of harmless error, which allows for a certain 
degree of error by local courts.324 This is even more relevant with regards to IIA. As such, 
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the Tribunal wanted to avoid functioning as fourth instance by expressly pointing out the 
dichotomy between single acts of unlawfulness and acts that go against the rule of law 
itself as well as between fourth instance violations and violations of the international 
standard.
Having established its role in the dispute, the Tribunal moved on to assess the substantial 
claims of the investor. It had essentially provided four grounds on which there had been an 
alleged breach of the element of due process. This chapter will only focus on the most 
relevant grounds, namely the “new law argument,” retroactivity and the issue of immunity.
First, the Tribunal did not find the Claimants argument about the new law convincing. It 
found that the principle applied by the Court, originally formulated in Leigh v. Rule, was a 
principle that existed in many other systems of contract law and that even if the principle 
had constituted a new principle, the decision would have fallen within the limits of 
common law adjudication.325 Here, the court found that there was nothing in the conduct of 
the appeals court that would have “shocked or surprised even a delicate judicial 
sensibility.”326
With regards to the second issue, the main problem was whether a change in judicial 
practice can have a retrospective effect, or whether it is strictly limited to a prospective 
effect. The Tribunal was of the opinion that the principle applied in the case fell within the 
ambit of lawmaking exercised by courts.327 In addition to this, the Tribunal referred
ECtHR cases where the Court in question had dealt with the retrospective application of 
criminal law in light of Article 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights.328 In those 
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cases, the Court did not exclude the possibility that a retrospective application of criminal
law could be used in the accused disadvantage.329 However, this was still limited to 
situations where the rule existed, and the “elucidation of doubtful points” and “adaptation 
to changing circumstances” took place within the accepted boundaries of judicial 
lawmaking in a legal tradition.330 Based on this, the Tribunal concluded that it was indeed 
possible for local courts to apply new decisional law retrospectively.331
Finally, the Tribunal turned to the immunity claims. As mentioned above, the Supreme 
Judicial Court declined to enforce the jury’s verdict against the city because Massachusetts 
Tort Claims Act granted immunity to the City, something the investor regarded as a 
violation of Article 1105. The Tribunal pointed out that it is a well-established principle 
within international law that states and their agencies can claim immunity despite that 
conduct being civilly wrongful.332 The Tribunal supported its claims on ECtHR case law, 
where it has been established that immunity does not constitute a denial of access to court 
in violation of Article 6(1).333 However, the general doctrine of foreign state immunity, 
which the US government argued to be analogous to the current situation, refers to the host 
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states immunity from being subjected to claims in the jurisdiction of another state. Here, 
the Tribunal pointed out that there is a closer analogy to situations where the issue 
concerns statutory immunities of state agencies in front of domestic courts.334 Again, the 
Tribunal looked to the case law of the ECtHR, in which the issue had been discussed. 
Primarily, the Court has condemned the unlimited possibility of a state to remove 
jurisdiction from municipal courts from hearing a whole range of civil claims, although it 
pointed out that Article 6(1) did not provide a claimant with a substantive civil right.335
The Tribunal pointed out that the decisions by the ECtHR were not concerned with 
investment protection. Therefore they can, at most, only give guidance by ‘analogy as to 
the possible scope of NAFTA’s guarantee of “treatment in accordance with international 
law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security”.’336 Despite 
this, the Tribunal did observe that the existence of immunity for the City, in this case,
should be classified as a matter of substance, thus rendering the arguments on access to 
court by the ECtHR without effect.337
In its conclusion, the Tribunal recognized that a violation of the FET standard is dependent 
on the tortious act to which the state is granted immunity.338 The Tribunal assessed the 
motivations behind the decision of the judges to uphold the City’s immunity and came to a
conclusion that:
“[…][R]easons can well be imagined why a legislature might decide to 
immunize a regulatory authority, mandated to deal with commercial 
redevelopment plans, from potential liability for tortious interference.”339
The reason why the Tribunal did not find a violation of Article 1105 was because it was
not convinced the breach of contractual obligations was serious enough to violate the 
international standard minimum standard. Immunity in itself could not constitute a
legitimate grounds for a violation. This is because the host states immunity does not extend 
to violations of customary international law, including the FET standard, and therefore it 
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does not restrict the investor’s possibility to seek a remedy under IIA. Finally, the Tribunal 
concluded that since the application of the Massachusetts law did not involve arbitrary or
discriminatory actions, it was “far from clear” in which way the statutory immunity in 
itself could have been unfair and inequitable.340
As it is evident from the case, the high threshold of the FET standard permeates the 
element of due process. Considering that the Tribunal would have had to overrule state
immunity in the current case, something sacrosanct which many Tribunals go great lengths 
to avoid challenging, it could be argued that the acts by the City be no way egregious 
enough to outweigh the (political) consequences from waiving state immunity.
6.1.1.2 Loewen v. the United States.
The case concerned a commercial dispute between a Canadian funeral service corporation, 
Loewen group, and Jeremiah O’Keefe who were competitors in the funeral home business 
in Mississippi. The disputing parties had entered into some commercial agreements on 
which O’Keefe later based his anti-trust and breach of contract claims against Loewen. The 
actual amount suffered by O’Keefe amounted to about 4million dollars. Together with his 
counsel, O’Keefe managed to establish a case based on prejudicial statements that referred 
to race, nationality and social class.341 Their strategy, which manifestly succeeded, was to 
paint a picture of O’Keefe as being a poor local businessman, a true patriot that had served 
in the Second World War. Now, he was being bullied by a big foreign corporation that did 
not care for the poor, African American people nor the United States in general.342 In its 
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verdict, the jury awarded the Plaintiff, O’Keefe, $500,000,000 in damages. The investor
tried to appeal the verdict, but the district judge refused to decrease the bond requirements 
which under Mississippi law require that a bond of 125% of the damages awarded has to 
be placed for the execution of the judgment to be postponed.343 This eventually forced the 
investor to sign a settlement deal with O’Keefe amounting to $175 million.344
In the current case, the investor argued that the fact that the trial court had allowed the 
Claimant to base his case on nationality, racial and class-related arguments and comments 
constituted a direct violation of Article 1105 of NAFTA. The investor also argued that the 
excessive verdict constituted a violation of the same article. Finally, the investor argued 
that the bond requirements were arbitrary and in violation of Article 1105.345
The Government, on the other hand, claimed that the investor had not exhausted all local 
remedies and that there, therefore, did not exist any justifiable grounds for the investor’s
denial of justice claims.346 In addition to this, the Government contended that the 
proceedings had in fact been conducted in a fair manner and that it was the shortcomings 
of the counsel of Loewen who was to blame for not objecting to the alleged prejudicial 
claims made by opposing counsel.347 Finally, the Government argued that the fact the 
investor had settled for a fifth of the initial verdict cannot be seen as so “grossly excessive” 
as to breach the international minimum standard.348
While the Tribunal rejected the claim on jurisdictional grounds, there are nonetheless many 
relevant arguments that were emphasized in the case. The Tribunals general sentiment 
towards the trial was that of, in lack of a more fitting word, disgust. 
“[…][W]e have reached the firm conclusion that the conduct of the trial by 
the trial judge was so flawed that it constituted a miscarriage of justice 
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amounting to a manifest injustice as that expression is understood in 
international law.”349
The Tribunal was unanimous in its opinion that the Trial judge had grossly failed to afford 
due process to Loewen when the judge did not prevent the tactics used by the counsel of 
O’Keefe.350 Therefore, it defied common sense to argue, as the Government did, that 
Loewen had waived its objections to due process. 351 However, these factors did not by 
themselves constitute a denial of justice in breach of Article 1105, as there existed some 
procedural impediments which will be discussed later.
The Tribunal also assessed the question regarding the compensation and punitive damages 
awarded to O’Keefe. It concluded that the award appeared to be “grossly disproportionate” 
to the actual damage that O’Keefe had suffered, which only included damages amounting 
to approximately $4 million.352
Having established that the compensation was grossly disproportionate, the Tribunal 
turned to the question of whether the whole trial constituted a breach of the minimum 
standard contained in Article 1105. First, the Tribunal pointed out that the host state is 
under an obligation in international law to provide an alien with a fair trial, which requires 
that the alien not be subjected to discrimination or be the object of sectional or local 
prejudice.353 Second, it formulated the threshold for which there is a due process violation 
of Article 1105, namely that the dismal proceedings have to constitute a: 
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“Manifest injustice in the sense of a lack of due process leading to an 
outcome which offends a sense of judicial propriety is enough, even if one 
applies the Interpretation according to its terms.”354
The Tribunal concluded that the whole trial and the subsequent verdict were improper and 
discernable and as a result was not compatible with the FET standard.355 As it is clear from 
it arguments, the Tribunal relied on a general test of “offending judicial propriety” when 
assessing the actions. It is unclear how this test functions in relation to the broader public 
mentioned in the Neer case. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to think that the “egregiousness” 
would equally have been reached in that the conduct in the court proceedings clearly 
shocks and outrages any impartial person.
Despite this, there remained the procedural impediment, namely the question of exhausting 
local remedies. In general, local remedies should be effective, adequate and available for
the obligation to exhaust them to be in force.356 The Tribunal clarified, that availability 
means that it should be reasonably available for the investor, which includes financial 
circumstances.357 According to the Tribunal, the investor had failed to show why entering 
into a settlement agreement was preferable than pursuing other options, mainly the 
possibility to directly appeal to the Supreme Court based on the due process claims.358
Therefore, the Tribunal concluded that there had been no violation of Article 1105.
The Tribunal also added some final words in its conclusion. It recognized that there had 
been unfairness towards Loewen and that this was indeed a case where the ideals of 
NAFTA could have “been given some teeth.”359 While the Tribunal admitted that the 
“human reaction” and the natural instinct to step in and rectify the miscarriage of justice 
had been present in the minds of the arbitrators, it was nonetheless more important to 
preserve the viability of NAFTA. While the Tribunal agreed that a failure of providing 
                                                
354 Ibid. para. 132. The Tribunal supported its formulation on the reasoning made in the Mondev case, where 
the tribunal in question stated that: “the question is whether, at an international level and having regard to 
generally accepted standards of the administration of justice, a tribunal can conclude in the light of all the 
facts that the impugned decision was clearly improper and discreditable, with the result that the investment 
has been subjected to ‘unfair and inequitable treatment’”
355 Ibid. para. 137.
356 Loewen v. United States, Award (26 June 2003), para. 168.
357 Ibid. para. 169
358 Ibid. para. 215.
359 Ibid. para. 241.
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adequate means of remedy falls within the ambit of the international standard, this is only 
the case when the remedy has de facto been the last resort.360 In the end, the Tribunal was 
not ready to compromise the interests and principles of the international investment 
community by transforming itself into an appellate instance.
The procedural impediments were not that obvious, and the Tribunal could arguably just as 
well have granted the investors claims. Some authors argue that the fact that the Tribunal 
was so reluctant to find a violation was due to the strong reaction that a condemnatory 
award might have had in the US Congress.361 To which degree this is true is arguable. 
However, it is clear from the Tribunals own statements that they have been mindful of the 
“larger picture” that the award would affect. The Tribunal emphasized the interest of the 
international investment community, and as such, it is not far-fetched to conclude that the 
arbitrators are mindful of the broader policy implications that the award might have.362
This case serves as a good example of how Tribunals are affected by the legal culture
which seemingly dictates invisible boundaries. This is, of course, one of the adverse effects 
of the culture, as it arguably limits the Tribunal more than what the law does.
Nonetheless, the case still exemplifies a clear situation, where the egregiousness of the acts 
undoubtedly elicit such a reaction which “outrages or shocks” a reasonable an impartial 
person. The awards serve as an indicator of the circumstances which have to prevail for the 
international standard to be breached. It is granted that this case was extraordinary. 
However, it still legitimizes the fears that many investors have when they face proceedings 
in local courts. While they are few and far apart, the FET standard functions as an absolute 
bottom line that protects against local court trials that have entirely derailed.
6.1.2 Substantial Denial of Justice
As mentioned above, the concept of denial of justice is composed of two dimensions, a 
procedural and a substantial. While the procedural dimension puts the requirements on the 
individual process, the substantial dimension is a reference to the law itself. In a state 
where the rule of law prevails, the law binds the judicial actors and to that end, they are 
ideally constrained from using power arbitrarily. The substantial includes protections 
                                                
360 Ibid. para. 242.
361 Dumberry (2013), page 251.
362 One risk being that there is a strong backlash against the whole ISDS mechanism as the sentiment in the 
State is that their judicial independence is being challenged by international investment tribunals.
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against situations where laws are being applied at the “whims of the rulers.”363 This 
chapter is a brief analysis of the concept of arbitrariness and discrimination, the two main 
components of substantial denial of justice.
From a broader perspective, this subchapter concerns the substantial guarantees provided 
by due process. As mentioned in the beginning, due process constitutes a free-standing 
element of the FET standard.364 In other words, if a host state discriminates or acts 
arbitrarily towards the investor in a way that amounts to a substantial denial of justice, 
there is a clear violation of the FET standard. There are arguments against this 
interpretation as well.365 Some authors question why treaty drafters would use different 
terms if they all mean the same thing.366 It could be argued that there is significant overlap 
between the different terms, which makes the differences non-existent in reality.367 In any 
event, since most Tribunals have interpreted arbitrariness and discriminatory treatment as 
being an element of the FET standard, there is not much to gain in concentrating on the 
[semantic] differences between them.
6.1.2.1 Arbitrariness
The ICJ has provided definitions on arbitrariness. In the Asylum case, the Court argued that 
actions are arbitrary when the action substitutes the rule of law.368 In the Elsi case, the 
Court developed this argument by stating that an act is arbitrary if it opposes to the rule of 
law and if this opposition is a willful disregard of due process that shocks or at least 
surprises a sense of judicial propriety.369
Arbitrary conduct can thus be regarded as a violation of the standard requirement to act in 
accordance with domestic law.370 However, the ICJ has underlined that from the mere fact 
that an act of a public authority is unlawful under municipal law, does not automatically 
                                                
363 Vandevelde (2010), page 50. 
364 Schill (2006), page 19 & Dumberry (2013), page 205.
365 See further Dolzer & Schreuer (2011), pages 190-197.
366 Dolzer & Schreuer (2011), page 194.
367 Id.
368 Asylum Case, (Colombia v. Peru), Judgement, I.C.J. Rep. (1950), page 284
369 Elsi judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989, page 76, para 128
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follow that this act is unlawful also under international law.371 Thus, the fact that an act has 
been unlawful under municipal law does not in itself prove arbitrariness but can be used as 
an argument in support of the act also being arbitrary.372 This has further been elaborated 
in IIA by the Gami v. Mexico case, where the Tribunal stated that:
“[A] government's failure to implement or abide by its own law in a manner 
adversely affecting a foreign investor may but will not necessarily lead to a 
violation of Article 1105”373
The case concerned an American investor that was involved in processing sugar in Mexico. 
In 2001, the Mexican state expropriated five sugar mills that were the property of the 
investor through a new legislation, the “sugar decree.” The investor argued that the 
expropriations were flagrant and arbitrary and that the Mexican government had 
“arbitrarily and discriminatorily implemented certain aspects of the law and capriciously 
refused to implement and enforce others.”374 In the case, the Tribunal found that 
maladministration by the host state constitutes a violation of Article 1105 only if it 
amounted to an “outright and unjustified repudiation” of the relevant regulations.375
Therefore, if the host state fails to abide by its laws and regulations, this does not amount 
to an arbitrary act that is in violation of the FET standard if it lacks an “outright and 
unjustified repudiation.”376
The common denominator for arbitrary acts seems to include situations where there is a 
“manifest lack of reasons.”377 Another way of determining whether an act has been 
arbitrary is if there does not exist a relationship between the means and the end of the 
                                                
371 Elsi judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989, page 76, para. 124.
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373 Gami v. Mexico, Award, (15 November 2004), para. 91. This stance is also supported by other Tribunals, 
such as: ADF v. United States, Award, (9 January 2003), para. 190, Glamis v. United States, Award, (8 June 
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374 Gami v. Mexico, Award, (15 November 2004), para. 88 and 98.
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376 Dumberry (2013), page 206. 
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requirement.378 In Cargill, the Tribunal found that Mexico had acted arbitrarily since there 
existed a divergence between the actual aim of the legislation and the means through which 
it was actualized.379 The Tribunal found it to be manifestly unjust to institute a permit 
requirement for foreign producers in the single attempt to persuade the United States to 
alter its trade practices.380 In addition to this, the Tribunal pointed out that the permit 
requirements issued by the Mexican state were based on a “complete lack of objective 
criteria.”381
Another aspect of arbitrariness is when there exists a “deliberate conspiracy” against the 
investor. In the Waste Management case, this was a specific issue of the case. The case 
concerned a concession contract between the investor and a Mexican municipality. After 
the contract had entered into force, several of the exclusive rights granted to the investor
under the contract were violated. The Claimant argued that the Mexican agencies 
conspired to frustrate the concession, which constituted an arbitrary act that was in 
violation of Article 1105. The Tribunal agreed that if there existed such a deliberate 
conspiracy, which it defined as a “conscious combination of various agencies of 
government without justification to defeat the purposes of an investment agreement,” then 
there would be no doubt that this constituted a violation of the FET standard under Article
1105.382 However, as there existed sufficient reasons to explain the collapse of the 
concessions agreement, the Tribunal found that it was unnecessary to resort to conspiracy 
theories that were unsupported by solid evidence.383
All in all, in those Tribunals where the question of arbitrariness has been assessed, the 
threshold has consistently been set high.384 In its essence, all Tribunals require that the 
arbitrary act committed by the host state reached the original standard set out in the Elsi
case, namely that the arbitrariness ‘shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical
propriety.’385 It is debatable whether “manifest arbitrariness” is required to reach the 
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customary international standard, since many of the abovementioned cases include actions 
which seem arbitrary, just not that arbitrary. Whether or not there is a need for an adjective 
qualifier for the arbitrariness to constitute a violation of the FET standard is of little 
importance. What is important to note, however, is that the act needs to be arbitrary on an 
international level.
6.1.2.2 Discrimination
The prohibition of discrimination is usually well covered in an investment treaty, which is 
also the case with NAFTA. NAFTA, including most if not all BITs, contain clauses on NT 
MFN. Without further elaborating the content of these clauses, their primary function is to 
outlaw all discrimination that is based on nationality. For example, by the NT clause, the 
host state is obliged to provide the same treatment to a foreign investor as it provides to its 
nationals. Arguably, the FET standard also contains a prohibition against discrimination, 
which some authors regard as one of the constitutive elements of the FET standard 
alongside with arbitrariness.386 However, discrimination under the FET standard is not 
based on nationality as the abovementioned standards already cover it. Instead, this kind of 
discrimination includes other more specific types of discrimination. Generally speaking, 
these grounds include those types of discrimination, which are included in Article 2 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), such as race, religion and political 
opinion.387
The additional requirement under the FET standard is that the difference in treatment that 
the investor is alleging has to be arbitrary, unreasonable and not based on a rational 
foundation.388 This means that the FET standard does not prohibit discrimination by itself, 
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but that only such scenarios where the discrimination is unreasonable, does the host state
violate the FET standard.389 Justified discrimination should therefore have a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory purpose.390 While this can seem contradictory on first reading, it is 
important to note that there is a difference in discriminating for discrimination's sake, and 
discriminating against some other, legitimate purpose. This will become clearer by 
analyzing how it has been applied in case law. 
In Methanex v United States, the investor, a Canadian company, brought a claim against 
the US because the state of California had adopted measures that allegedly had the intent 
of discriminating and harming Methanex and other foreign methanol producers. The 
measures included an executive order and regulations that banned the use of MTBE 
reformulated gasoline, in which a key ingredient is methanol. Here, the US contended that 
the FET standard constituted an absolute minimum standard of treatment, and 
discrimination under this standard is not dependent on how the host state treats its 
nationals.391
The Tribunal agreed with the arguments presented by the US in that the FET standard does 
not by its “plain and natural meaning” preclude governmental differentiations between 
nationals and aliens.392 General international law does not provide a prohibition against 
treating aliens different than nationals. However, this obligation can be established through 
treaties.393 Since the FET standard constitutes the minimum standard provided by 
customary international law, any discrimination based on nationality that is not based on 
such unreasonable grounds mentioned above, should in theory not constitute a violation of 
the FET standard. However, the Tribunal was not very specific in what kind of 
discrimination is in fact included in the FET standard. The Tribunal simply stated, “some 
differentiations are discriminatory.”394 On these grounds, the Tribunal found that the ban 
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on MTBE by the state of California had not been discriminatory or in any way exposed the 
investor to “sectional or racial prejudice.”395
In conclusion, there seems to be a definitive stance that discrimination under the FET 
standard does not include nationality based differentiations unless the treatment is coupled
with a violation of some other element of the FET standard.396 While it is somewhat 
unclear whether discrimination constitutes a stand-alone element of the FET standard, 
there is compelling evidence that points to that this would be the case if the discrimination 
were severe enough. 397 This would almost definitely be the case if the investor were the 
target of sectional and racial prejudice. However, these situations seem relatively 
improbable in practice. Therefore, a simple discrimination, which lacks severity, is 
excluded from being a violation of the FET standard. 
6.2 Good Faith
Good faith (bona fide) is a general principle of law. General principles of law, as 
mentioned in a previous chapter, are a source of international law.398 In the Nuclear Tests 
Case from 1974, the ICJ concluded that the principle of good faith constituted one of the 
“basic principles governing the creation and performance of legal obligations, whatever 
their source.”399 This does not mean that the principle of good faith is an autonomous 
stand-alone obligation.400 This was pointed out by the ICJ when it stated that the 
“[principle of good faith] is not in itself a source of obligation where none would 
otherwise exist.”401
The general principle of pacta sunt servanda contained in Article 26 of the VCLT, 
obligates the parties to abide by the treaty in good faith. Also, when interpreting a treaty, 
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the VCLT obligates that it is to be interpreted in good faith.402 From this follows that there 
is a default assumption when entering the treaty, the parties did so in good faith. This also 
explains the rules contained in Article 32 of the VCLT which aims to avoid, among other 
things, unreasonable results as there is an assumption that none of the parties intended such 
results when entering their commitments. 
The principle can be defined as meaning “honesty of purpose or sincerity of declaration”
or “the expectation of such qualities in others.”403 While it has been pointed out that it is 
impossible to give an a priori definition of the principle as it can only be illustrated, not 
defined, some authors have nonetheless provided a comprehensive definition of the 
principle:404
“The principle of good faith in international law is a fundamental principle 
from which the rule pacta sunt servanda and other legal rules distinctively 
and directly related to honesty, fairness and reasonableness are derived, and 
the application of these rules is determined at any particular time by the 
compelling standards of honesty, fairness and reasonableness prevailing in 
the international community at that time.”405
The principle of good faith is equally as important under international investment law. It 
has been compared to as having a similar function as the FET standard.406 However, it 
stands fairly clear among authors and Tribunals that the principle is not a stand-alone 
element of the FET standard.407 This is exemplified trough ADF v. the United States. As 
mentioned above, the issue in ADF concerned a public procurement and specific rules in 
the Buy America Act that limited the Canadian steel from being used in the project. The 
Claimant argued that the US had violated the general principle of good faith and that there 
as such existed a breach of the FET standard. The Tribunal did not find a violation of the 
FET standard simply because the US had allegedly acted in contrary to good faith. The 
Tribunal argued that:
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“An assertion of breach of a customary law duty of good faith adds only 
negligible assistance in the task of determining or giving content to a 
standard of fair and equitable treatment.“408
The Tribunal was therefore of the opinion that a lack of good faith, just as negligence in 
municipal law, only adds to the motivation of the state which may assist the finding of a 
violation of the FET standard. The critical takeaway is therefore that the principle of good 
faith is not a stand-alone element of the FET, meaning that it has to be combined with 
some other element of the FET for there to be a violation of the standard. 
In addition to this, it is important to note, that there does not exist a requirement of bad 
faith (mala fide) in order for there to exist a breach of another element of the FET standard.
Bad faith is defined by Dolzer & Schreuer (2012) as an action by a state where legal 
instruments are used for other purposes that for which they were created.409 More 
specifically, acts that are directed at inflicting damage on the investment or attempts to 
defeat it as a whole is considered to be bad faith.410 However, a host state can perfectly
well stand in breach of the investor’s rights to, for example, due process without there 
existing any evidence of bad faith. This stance has been reaffirmed in several awards.411
Finally, something can be said about the similarity between the FET standard and the 
principle of good faith. While extensive critique has been directed against the FET 
standard with regards to its vagueness, it can be argued that this aspect of the standard is 
actually a virtue.412 Since the standard has a similar function as the principle of good faith 
has in codes of civil law countries, the FET standard is beneficial as it prescribes protection
to investor’s rights that otherwise would be impossible to anticipate with more specific 
rules.413
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6.3 Legitimate Expectations 
It cannot be said that there exists a clear consensus with regards to the requirement of 
legitimate expectations. Some authors argue that it is merely a creative construction of the 
arbitrators who try to attribute unfounded meaning to the FET standard.414 Others argue 
that it is a vital part of the standard, as it “requires that the perceptions of the law’s 
subjects and their expectations vis-à-vis government activity be taken into account.”415 As 
the case law will show, Tribunals have established explicit preconditions for the element of 
legitimate expectations and as such, the latter author is arguably closer to the truth when it 
comes to describing the element.
The first NAFTA tribunal to examine the issue regarding the investor’s legitimate 
expectations was in the Metalclad case.416 It was not until the ADF case, however, that the 
term “legitimate expectations” was used.417 The Metalclad case was concerned with the
revocation of a permit to run a hazardous landfill in Mexico after it had already been 
constructed. The primary question in the case was whether an additional municipal permit 
had also been required prior to the construction of the hazardous landfill.418 Metalclad had 
not applied for this permit before initiating the construction, as the investor had relied on 
the assurances by federal officials, who affirmed that the permit which the investor had 
already attained was sufficient. The Tribunal concluded that Metalclad “was led to 
believe” that the existing permit would suffice and that Metalclad was entitled to this belief 
as it relied on the assurances by federal officials.419
While the Tribunal did not base Mexico’s violation of the FET standard, the Tribunal did, 
however, provide essential preconditions for legitimate expectations. These include that the 
investor’s expectation has to be founded on specific representations, which in turn have 
been given by government officials and considering the circumstances as a whole, the 
expectations by the investor have to be reasonable.420
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As mentioned above, it was not until the ADF Tribunal that the term “legitimate 
expectations” was used.421 The case concerned a highway construction project in which 
ADF was to function as a steel supplier to the construction project. However, the Buy 
America Act (1982) mandates that construction procurements that are related to rail or 
road transportation have to use American made steel. As a result, ADF was prohibited
from cutting and processing American made steel in Canada. This, according to the 
investor, constituted a breach of its legitimate expectations specifically because the US 
Authorities had refused to apply pre-existing case law, which would have exempted the 
investor from the Buy America provisions.422 The Tribunal did not accept the investor’s 
argument since it found that misleading representations made by US government officials 
did not create the expectations that the investor had.423
Here, the Tribunal seems to have confirmed the findings in Metalclad, when it made 
references to the “misleading representations made by authorized officials.”424 The ADF
Tribunal thus reaffirmed that for investors’ expectations to be legitimate, they need to be 
based on specific representations made by the competent authorities.
In Thunderbird v Mexico, the Tribunal provided a clear definition of legitimate expectation 
as well as a clarification on the ambit of what expectations should not be regarded as 
reasonable. The case concerned an American investor that had received an official opinion 
from the Mexican authorities responsible for the gambling regulation. The investor had 
relied on the opinion when deciding whether to invest in the intended operations in 
Mexico. However, as it later came to light, the investor had given false information to the 
authorities on which the authorities had based its decision on the investor’s project. For 
this reason, the Tribunal did not find that Mexico had breached the investor’s legitimate 
expectations. The investor had been fully aware of the fact that the information given to the 
authorities was false and that the true nature of the project was illegal under Mexican law.
Therefore, the investor could not reasonably have relied on the information given by the 
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authorities.425 As a consequence, the Tribunal made it clear that unreasonable expectations
include situations where the investor has not disclosed all the relevant information to the 
deciding authority.426
In addition to this, the Tribunal in Thunderbird defined legitimate expectations:
“[T]he concept of “legitimate expectations” relates, within the context of the 
NAFTA framework, to a situation where a Contracting Party’s conduct 
creates reasonable and justifiable expectations on the part of an investor (or 
investment) to act in reliance on said conduct, such that a failure by the 
NAFTA Party to honour those expectations could cause the investor (or 
investment) to suffer damages.”427
The Tribunal follows the definition used in the Metalclad Tribunal while adding a fourth 
point, namely the requirement that the investor has to suffer damages. Subsequently, in 
order for there to exist a breach of the element of legitimate expectations, the following
requirements need to be met: (a) whether there has been an unequivocal representation
made by the state, (b) the investor has relied on these representations, and this reliance has 
been reasonable and justifiable, (c) the state has acted inconsistently to these
representations and finally (d) that the investor has suffered a loss due to the inconsistent 
behavior of the state.428
It is necessary to clarify further what kind of representations if breached, constitute a 
violation of an investor’s legitimate expectation. The Tribunal in Glamis Gold has 
elaborated on this issue. The case concerned a mining company, Glamis Gold, which 
argued that its legitimate expectations had been breached due to the revocation of the 
approval for a mining project. In the case, the conditions for allowing mining operations in 
California were significantly changed by a legal opinion. Here, the Tribunal reiterated the 
findings in Thunderbird, as it argued that the expectations of the investor have to be 
“reasonable and justifiable,” and that objective expectations should induce this.429
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The important part, in this case, is how the Tribunal reasoned with the relationship between 
the state’s right to regulate and the investor’s legitimate expectations. As a general 
principle, a state cannot violate the investor’s legitimate expectations by changing its laws, 
even if the expectations of the investor are reasonable.430 This is due to the requirement of 
specific representations. The state's representation is not specific enough in cases where 
the investor has merely relied on the current domestic legal framework. The Tribunal set 
out a higher standard, which required a “quasi-contractual” relationship between the state
and the investor.431 This means that the state must have given specific representations to 
the investor where the state has “purposely and specifically induced the investment.”432
The Tribunal finally disregarded the claims by the investor, as it did not find that the state
had given any such specific representations or that there existed a “quasi-contractual 
relationship” that would have induced reasonable and justified expectations for the 
investor. The Tribunal made it clear that “a claimant cannot have a legitimate expectation 
that the host country will not pass legislation that will affect it.”433 While this certainly is 
the case, legislation and policy changes should still be “implemented in good faith and in a 
non-abusive manner and that public-interest arguments will not be used as a disguise for 
arbitrary and discriminatory measures.”434
In conclusion, the requirement should not be viewed as a standalone element of the FET 
standard.435 This means that a breach in itself cannot lead to a violation of the FET 
standard. Instead, the investor’s legitimate expectations must always be coupled with
concrete damages that have been caused to the investor. The element has several 
preconditions, which are not easily met. When determining whether the element has been 
fulfilled, the most important aspects to recognize are the requirement that the 
representations are specific and that the expectations are legitimate. This excludes both 
general commitments made by the host state and expectations by the investor that are
unreasonable considering the circumstances. The specific representations have to be made
within a “quasi-contractual relationship” existing between the host state and the investor, 
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and these representations should have purposely induced the investments. A breach of an 
investor’s legitimate expectation requires a strict connection between the representations 
given by the state and the expectations of the investor. However, this exclusion does not 
apply to those scenarios where the subjective expectations of an investor have led to lost 
investment opportunities due to the investment climate in the host country.
6.3.1 Compliance with Contractual Obligations
In connection with the discussion on legitimate expectations, it is necessary to briefly 
discuss the host state’s obligations to comply with contractual obligations. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, the host state is obliged to respect all specific representations made to 
the investor. However, this leads to the question whether any breach of a term in a 
contract, which undoubtedly falls into the category of being specific representations,
necessarily leads to a violation of the FET standard?
While a gross violation of a contract could surely mean a violation of the FET standard, 
any contractual violation by the host state does not automatically mean that it constitutes a 
violation of the standard.436 This has been discussed in several cases.
The Tribunal in Glamis pointed out that a mere violation of a term in a contract does not 
constitute a breach of the investor’s legitimate expectations; “something more” is 
required.437 Here, the Tribunal specified that this could include denial of justice or 
discrimination by the state.438 In Mondev, the Tribunal prohibited states from violating 
their obligations that they have committed themselves to in an investment contract. The 
Tribunal stated:
“Indeed a governmental prerogative to violate investment contracts would 
appear to be inconsistent with the principles embodied in Article 1105 and 
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with contemporary standards of national and international law concerning 
governmental liability for contractual performance”439
On a closer reading, it is more probable that the Tribunal only took a stance against the 
state having the prerogative to violate investment contracts. According to the Tribunal, 
states do not have an inherent right to violate investment contracts, but a breach of contract 
does not necessarily lead to a violation of the FET standard. It is understandable that the 
Tribunal took a strong stance against this right, as it would hardly improve relations 
between states and investors if the Tribunal openly accepted some breaches of contract, as 
long as they are not severe enough. Pacta sunt servanda needs to be the premise for any 
contractual relationship, regardless if the FET standard only protects against serious 
violations.
This line of reasoning is similar to the conclusions reached in the Waste Management case, 
where the Tribunal excluded a simple breach of contract from the ambit of the FET 
standard. A contractual breach by a state violates the FET standard if it amounts to an 
“outright and unjustified repudiation of the transaction.”440
It is clear that a contractual breach by the state has to reach some degree of severity for
there to exist a violation of the FET standard. This is supported by the conclusions made 
by the Glamis Gold Tribunal that pointed out that a mere violation of a term in a contract 
cannot constitute a violation of an investor’s legitimate expectations since a violation 
requires “something more.” While an investor might have expectations that all the terms of
the contract will be complied with, these expectations are not part of the legitimate
expectations within the ambit of the FET standard. This is important to underline since it 
would otherwise be possible to argue that the investor had legitimate expectations that all 
the obligations contained in the contract would be followed and that thus any violation of 
the contract would constitute a breach of the FET standard. While the requirement of 
damages could surely mitigate these claims by the investor, it is still preferential that the 
element does not contain a categorical prohibition of minor breaches of contract.
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6.4 Transparency
Transparency could be regarded as an integral requirement of the FET standard.441
According to the UNCTAD interpretation, fair and equitable treatment requires that the 
investor be aware of the rules and regulations that are binding upon it. In other words, the 
investor should be aware of all administrative and other binding decisions that are imposed
on it.442 This means that a reference to the FET standard contains a requirement of 
transparency on its own. In a later amendment to its interpretation, the UNCTAD points
out that while transparency is a means to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory conduct; some
countries do not have the regulatory and institutional framework to make this possible.443
To get a better conception of the element of transparency, it is necessary to look at some 
key cases where the issue has been discussed.
So far, only the Tribunal in Metalclad has found that a host state has breached the 
obligation of transparency, while other Tribunals have been reserved against applying it.444
In Metalclad, the Tribunal found that Mexico had breached Article 1105(1) in that it had 
“failed to ensure a transparent and predictable framework for Metalclad’s business 
planning and investments.”445 In this case, the Tribunal concluded that transparency was 
explicitly included in the objectives of NAFTA.446 This award was the object of set aside 
proceedings at the Supreme Court of Columbia, which dismissed the case to the extent that 
there had been a violation of the FET standard due to lack of transparency. 447 The Court 
argued that there exist no obligation of transparency as contained in chapter 11.448 Despite 
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this, the Tribunal provided a lengthy definition of the contents of transparency, which is 
still useful. 
In the case, the Tribunal found that transparency includes the idea that all relevant legal 
requirements that affect the investor should be “readily known” to the investor.449
Transparency also obligates the host state to correct all misunderstandings or confusion 
related to the legal requirements if it becomes aware of such rules and regulations.450 In the 
case, the Tribunal found that Mexico had violated the FET standard since the Investor had 
been given specific representations according to which there existed no legal basis for 
denying its application for a municipal construction permit.451 Here, Mexico had failed to 
ensure transparency since there had existed no rules on the requirement of a permit and a 
complete lack of any practice or procedure on how the applications were handled.452
This standard puts a heavy burden on the host state, and some authors have argued that this 
might force administrative agencies to become “consultative units and insurers for the 
implementation of foreign investment projects.”453 Another reading on the obligation 
suggests that the requirement of transparency mainly refers to the procedural aspects of 
administrative law, and as such is more a general reiteration of the rule of law relating to 
the investor’s procedural position in the administrative proceeding.454 Thus, the element of 
transparency should not require the host state to counsel and give them comprehensive 
legal advice to the investor.455
In any event, it is doubtful whether transparency can be regarded as an obligation imposed 
on states based on Article 1105. As mentioned in the beginning, only Metalclad has found 
that there has been a violation of transparency within the context of Article 1105. Other 
tribunals, such as Cargill and Merrill & Ring, have denied that transparency exists as a 
stand-alone element of the FET by arguing that a general duty of transparency not be
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included in the customary minimum standard owed to investors trough Article 1105.456
While the element of transparency seems to require that the host state provides the investor
with the necessary information about relevant legal requirements, this obligation should 
not be overemphasized. It is reasonable to think that a host state cannot stand in violation 
of the element of transparency without there existing some other culpable behavior by the 
state. The lack of transparency can be regarded as a necessary consequence of situations in 
which the host state is already in breach of the FET standard.
7 Conclusion
The FET standard as we know it today is a product of the increased popularity of IIA. As 
opposed to diplomatic protection, IIA grew to become the most effective means through 
which foreign property could be protected. In IIA, the FET standard has developed into the 
most popular standards of protecting foreign investors. When interpreting the FET 
standard, there was some evidence that arbitrators have recourse to the VCLT. However, it 
is questionable whether the formal rules of interpretation increase the predictability of the 
standard. When interpreting and applying the FET standard, many Tribunals supported
their arguments on previous awards despite the lack of any formal rules stare decisis. 
While this in itself does not constitute proof of consistency and predictability, it shows that 
Tribunals are very much aware of the general discussion concerning the standard, and as 
such are bound to be influenced by the legal culture to a certain degree.
In the context of NAFTA, there has been a clear trend towards equating the FET standard 
to CILMSTA. This culminated through the FTC note, which effectively put an end to 
speculations about the FET being “additive” to the international minimum standard.
Instead, the debate turned to the question of the development of customary international 
law. At issue was whether it had “frozen” or “evolved” since the famous the Neer case in 
the 1920s. The unanimous conclusion by different Tribunals was that the acts by the host 
state needed to be characterized as something that is “egregious.” The test for this was to 
apply the thought experiment in which the Tribunal analyzed the reaction by reasonable 
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and impartial persons. Here, the central question was whether the acts of the host state
“shocked or outraged” this impartial body of people. The standard is therefore not bound 
by a specific time in history, as the conceptions of what shocks or outrages can change 
over time. There was a clear consensus that the FET standard does not protect acts that
merely “raise some eyebrows” and damages that are connected to normal business risks.
This test is completely in line with the Critical understanding of indeterminacy and legal 
culture, as the Tribunals compare the facts of each case to a general understanding of what 
constitutes egregious acts in the eyes of an impartial body of people.
With regards to the application of the standard, it was clear that the high threshold that was 
established for the standard in theory was also upheld in practice. The standard consist of 
many sub-elements. Most of them are not “stand alone” elements meaning that they have 
to be connected with another element for there to exist a breach of the standard. While the 
element of due process has historically been the most successful base for investor’s claims, 
both Mondev and Loewen evidenced a strict adherence to the high threshold of the FET 
standard, at points almost unmercifully so.
Both cases showed that the Tribunals are aware of the political implications that an award 
against the host state might lead to. In Loewen, the Tribunal explicitly stated that it was not
ready to compromise the interests and principles of the international investment 
community by transforming itself into an appellate instance. Similarly, the Tribunal in 
Mondev upheld the immunity arguments made by the US. The apparent legal culture,
which can be evidenced throughout the abovementioned cases, seems to include a reserved 
attitude against applying the standard. Most Tribunals (with the apparent exceptions being 
Pope & Talbot, Metalclad and SD Myers) found that the threshold for the FET standard 
(and CILMSTA) is so high that it is only very exceptional cases, those that show obvious
egregiousness, which constitutes a breach of the FET standard. The facts in the Loewen
case gave an indication of what level the egregious actions had to reach for there to be a 
violation of the FET standard. As I consider myself as a somewhat of an impartial and 
reasonable person, I would readily have recognized the outrageous and shocking nature of 
the actions taken by the local court.
With regards to the element of legitimate expectations, which is purported as one of the 
principal weaknesses of the FET standard in the critique concerning the regulatory chill, it 
can be observed that this critique is not representative of the case law at hand. All awards 
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evidenced an adherence to a strict standard of application. Tribunals clearly underlined that 
investors could not legitimately expect that the host state will refrain from passing such 
laws that will affect its investment. Therefore, the argument that an investor could threaten 
host states with the remark “see you in court” with the aim of controlling domestic 
legislation does not seem like a logical strategy for the investor considering the prevailing 
case law.
***
This thesis has concerned itself with the question of what the average person readily 
recognizes as unacceptable behavior. The standard is predictable if the concerned actors 
readily recognize the behavior that violates the FET standard. I argue that the FET standard 
does, in fact, constitute a codification of such behavior that is to a large extent already 
being acted out by most (if not all) western liberal democracies. The FET standard cannot 
without a serious doubt be regarded as a vague standard which enables foreign investors to 
threaten host states, causing a regulatory chill on legislative initiatives. The evidence 
provided by the extensive case law point in another direction. Therefore, I find that the 
legal culture of NAFTA Tribunals have indeed corresponded to that which I classify as 
predictable in a good way.
A final word should be said about the impartiality of arbitrators as well as the future for the 
FET standard. The chief critics towards the ISDS system, such as Van Harten, seem to
base their arguments about the motivation of the arbitrators on a cynical perspective on 
human nature. He readily waives the possibility that some, if not the majority, of 
arbitrators, actually may strive for an award that is just. There is no reason why the
assumption that arbitrators are biased towards investors should be more logical that the 
one, that their sense of justice motivates them. The necessary conclusion is that all 
arguments about the arbitrator’s motivations have to be excluded, and the focus needs to be 
on the actual cases and their outcomes. As I argued at the beginning of this thesis: if the 
motivations are unknown, they should be inferred from the outcome of the actions. As this 
thesis has shown, arbitrators have been reluctant to find a breach of the FET standard by 
maintaining the high threshold for its applicability. In the few cases where there has been a 
consensus about the egregiousness, there have been clear and predictable grounds for 
concluding that the FET standard has been violated. Consequently, no evidence would
suggest that arbitrators are biased towards investors. 
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Concerning the future of the FET standard, there are a few indicators as to the way into 
which the development is headed. If the more recent US and Canadian model BITs are 
taken into account, there is a clear trend towards a more rigid standard compared to the 
relatively open-ended formulation of fair and equitable treatment contained in Article 1105 
of NAFTA. The new formulations suggest that the drafters have taken into account the 
“vagueness” critique. The most extreme example can be found in CETA, where the FET 
standard is formulated in seven paragraphs.457 This would probably also be the result of a 
new potential TTIP agreement. This is can be seen a step in the right direction, as the 
contents of the FET standard become even more explicit and thereby hopefully adding to
the predictability of the standard. However, the tradeoff with a more rigid and specific 
standard may be that it will lose its current quality of being adaptable to different 
circumstances – a quality which has been a benefit in highly complex investment disputes. 
In time, investment disputes stemming from CETA will show whether this is the case.
For now, there is no reason to excessively fear that investors would be able to make 
successful, but unfounded, claims against a host state. While it depends on who the parties 
appoint as arbitrators, most are likely to be motivated to find a solution that is reasonable, 
both for the parties as well as for the system as a whole. There is always a certain amount 
of uncertainty connected with investment disputes, or any dispute for that matter. Despite 
this, a reliable indicator of the way in which the dispute will be resolved resides within all 
of us; the never failing compass that directs us towards what is just and good.
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Annex
The Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA), Section D, Article 8.10 
Treatment of investors and of covered investments:
1. Each Party shall accord in its territory to covered investments of the other Party and to
investors with respect to their covered investments fair and equitable treatment and full 
protection and security in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 7. 
2. A Party breaches the obligation of fair and equitable treatment referenced in paragraph 1 
if a measure or series of measures constitutes: 
(a) denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; 
(b) fundamental breach of due process, including a fundamental breach of transparency, in 
judicial and administrative proceedings; 
(c) manifest arbitrariness; 
(d) targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race or 
religious 
belief; 
(e) abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress and harassment; or 
(f) a breach of any further elements of the fair and equitable treatment obligation adopted 
by the Parties in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article.
3. The Parties shall regularly, or upon request of a Party, review the content of the 
obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment. The Committee on Services and 
Investment, established under Article 26.2.1(b) (Specialised committees), may develop 
recommendations in this regard and submit them to the CETA Joint Committee for 
decision.
4. When applying the above fair and equitable treatment obligation, the Tribunal may take 
into account whether a Party made a specific representation to an investor to induce a 
covered investment, that created a legitimate expectation, and upon which the investor 
relied in deciding to make or maintain the covered investment, but that the Party 
subsequently frustrated.
5. For greater certainty, "full protection and security" refers to the Party's obligations 
relating to the physical security of investors and covered investments.
6. For greater certainty, a breach of another provision of this Agreement, or of a separate 
international agreement does not establish a breach of this Article.
7. For greater certainty, the fact that a measure breaches domestic law does not, in and of 
itself, establish a breach of this Article. In order to ascertain whether the measure breaches 
this Article, the Tribunal must consider whether a Party has acted inconsistently with the 
obligations in paragraph 1.
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